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Abstract 
This research examines the effect of the 1996 Telecommunications Act on the market 
structure and programming diversity in the United States radio industry. The 
implementation of the Act led to oligopolies on a national, local and format level. The 
implementation of the Act further led to decreased programming diversity on the radio. 
Three hypotheses are stated to measure decreasing diversity levels. The results suggest 
that diversity increased based on the average number of songs per artists but decreased 
based on the number of independent artists and bands. The results further suggest that 
there are other factors that led to these changes, which are not directly related to the 
implementation of the Act. 
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1. Introduction and Research Question 
“I think a lot of the time the reason that people pirate, is they want access to good music 
and they don’t get it because the radio is so s**t.” 
 –Thom Yorke, Frontman Radiohead 
 
People often like to criticise current pop music and are reminded of better times, 
when music meant something and was “actually” good. There are complaints about the 
topics discussed by rappers, such as drugs and violence, country artists only signing 
about drinking, their pick-up trucks and women, or the quality of pop music. Especially 
in pop music people often say that the artists are all the same and they are more 
concerned with building their own brand than with music. This might be true for some 
artists such as Nickelback, which is often accused of writing songs based on their desired 
target group and not based on their own beliefs, dreams or passion. This is also often seen 
as the reason why all the songs sound the same. People often argue that songs now are 
created for certain artists or an artist with a desired brand is found to perform a song. 
There is also evidence that this is not only due to people’s perception of music but that 
there are certain similarities that can be found in most popular songs. These are things 
such as “pitch transitions, the homogenization of the timbral palette and the growing 
loudness levels” (Serra, Corral, Boguna, Haro, & Josep, 2012). Last year there was also 
the discovery of The Millennial Whoop. The Whoop is a melodic sequence that can be 
found in a variety of modern music (Epstein, 2016) (For a video compilation of the 
Millennial Whoop in various songs visit here). These similarities also lead to a blur 
between music genres, since they are used in a variety of genres. With the increase of pop 
country artists, such as Luke Bryan, Blake Shelton or Florida Georgia Line; country fans 
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argue that there is no ‘real’ country music anymore. Instead there are just good-looking 
men and women that sing country music, which all sounds the same and does not reflect 
the struggles of the rural parts of the United States of America. These arguments expand 
beyond genres as people say rock, hip-hop, rap, and more have changed towards lyrics 
and melodies more appealing to the desired target groups. Preferences for music however 
are almost purely subjective and it is impossible to say that music is better or worse than 
it used to be. 
The same can be said for the quote of Thom Yorke. The changes in radio 
broadcasting and the songs that are played cannot be distinctly categorized as better or 
worse, as it all lies in the eye of the beholder. In discussions regarding the radio however, 
it is frequently argued that it is always the same songs and artists (DiCola & Thomson, 
2002, p. 67). This goes hand in hand with people who argue that music in general has 
gotten worse, so must the radio. There is also the argument that not only over time the 
same artists are played on the radio, but also across all stations. This means that there are 
fewer local differences in radio programming. In online and personal discussions, people 
often blamed the 1996 Telecommunications Act for these changes. The claims are mostly 
made by users without providing any empirical evidence and can mainly be considered 
their personal opinions. There however has been extensive research into the effects of the 
1996 Telecommunications Act on the market structure (Chipty, 2007) (DiCola, 2006) 
(DiCola & Thomson, 2002) (Drushel, 1998) (Sterling, 1997) (Wirth, 2007) (Wirth, 
2001). My personal interest in the music industry and the suggested effects of the 
Telecommunications Act inspired this research to evaluate some these opinions and 
arguments empirically. 
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The researcher conducted an interview with a former radio DJ in a large 
metropolitan area. The DJ was employed by Clear Channel Communications, the largest 
radio owner group. A transcript of the questions and answers can be found in Appendix 
1. The interviewee had to remain anonymous due to contractual obligations and non-
disclosure agreements. The interviewee is referred to by his reddit username 
Camel_Knight. The interviewee has been identified in a recent AmA on the online 
community reddit. AmA stands for Ask-me-Anything and features questions asked by 
community members and answered by the creator of the thread. Politicians (Barack 
Obama, Bernie Sanders), celebrities (Gordon Ramsay, Chris Pratt), business leaders (Bill 
Gates, Elon Musk) and other people of interest with unique experiences (Edward 
Snowden) frequently start AmAs to answer questions by the community. Camel_Knight 
could not disclose his identity publicly on the website but has been verified by a 
moderator of the website. The verification by the moderators requires tangible documents 
such as work or personal IDs (reddit). Camel_Knight hosted an IAmA regarding his 
experience as radio DJ, after which he has been approached regarding further questions. 
The answers provided will be used to support documents throughout the paper. 
As previously stated, whether ‘radio is s**t’ as Thom Yorke has put it and the 
music played on the radio is better or worse are subjective measures. It is therefore very 
difficult to obtain empirical results without extensive surveys of the population. This is 
even more difficult regarding the impacts of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, as it 
cannot be expected of people to remember their opinions on radio broadcasting from over 
20 years ago. Hence, to research whether the statements about the diversity of music on 
the radio are true, a research question and hypotheses have to be formulated.  
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The research question and the underlying hypotheses are further explained below. 
After specifying the research, this thesis provides an overview of the history radio 
regulation in the United States before the Telecommunications Act of 1996. This is 
followed by the changes the Act brought to radio broadcasting and the effects of those 
changes, which is done for different relevant markets. These effects are discussed for the 
national and local level as well as changes in the various radio formats that affect 
diversity. This is followed by an explanation of the process of data gathering that has 
been conducted to get the necessary information, as well as the research design. The 
research design provides more detailed insights into how the analysis is conducted. The 
analysis chapter provides the results of the three hypotheses that have been testes, which 
then are discussed in the following chapter. Lastly there is a conclusion that summarizes 
the findings of this research paper, followed by a bibliography and appendices. 
1.1. Research Question 
How did the implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act affect the market 
structure and programming diversity of the United States radio industry? 
The research question in this paper will seek to answer the question of the effects of 
the 1996 Telecommunications Act on the radio industry and more specifically on the 
market structure and the music played on the radio. One of the frequently stated opinions 
is that there has been a decrease in diversity on the radio, which is the first hypothesis 
that will be answered both in the literature review in terms of format diversity as well as 
in the analysis in form of artist diversity. This argument is further researched in the 
analysis. Since it is very difficult to measure the diversity of music, two different 
measures are introduced to see changes in radio programming. These measures are the 
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representation of independent artists and bands on the radio. Independent artists are often 
seen as more legitimate musicians compared to artists associated with a major label. 
Independent artists have a contract with an independent label, which is not controlled by 
one of the major label conglomerates. The major labels are Bertelsmann (BMG), EMI, 
MCA, Polygram, Sony, Vivendi Universal and AOL Time Warner (DiCola & Thomson, 
2002, pp. I-1). Independent artists have the reputation to be less concerned about their 
brand and more involved in the songs they are singing. Using this assumption, the effect 
on independent artists can provide some indication of changes in radio programming. The 
same can be said for the representation of bands on the radio. Bands usually involve at 
least one person playing an instrument, which makes them in some people’s eyes more 
legitimate musicians than solo artists, which often rely on electronic means to create 
music. The representation of bands on the radio therefore is also a good indication for the 
diversity of music programming on the radio. These two measures add another indicator 
for diversity. The tested hypotheses are that the 1996 Telecommunications Act led to less 
diversity in the number of artists, and fewer independent artists and bands.  
1.2. Hypotheses and Causal Mechanisms 
This section states the three hypotheses that are tested and provide information about 
the underlying assumptions that form the causal mechanisms for each hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: The 1996 Telecommunications Act and Number of Songs per Artist 
H1: The 1996 Telecommunications Act led to less artist diversity in the Billboard Radio 
Songs Top 50. 
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Causal Mechanism: 
The 1996 Telecommunications Act eliminated national ownership levels for radio 
station owners and drastically increased the local ownership caps (DiCola & Thomson, 
2002, p. 8). Radio station owners try to achieve economies of scale by increasing their 
holding of radio stations, which was not able to the same extend before the 
implementation of the act. These owners can save money by centralizing certain parts of 
the stations. One of the positions affect is the programming department. A radio station 
owner can centralize programming in one location and play the same or similar playlists 
on multiple stations (Camel_Knight, 2017). This decreases the number of decision 
makers that can now be more easily approached by record labels to introduce their artists. 
Record labels try to maximize their profits by presenting various songs of their artists. 
This saves them money on finding and scouting new talents and they can build on the 
brand of already established artists. This led to fewer artists with more songs, which 
represents a decrease in programming diversity on the artist level. 
Hypothesis 2: The 1996 Telecommunications Act and Independent Artists 
H2: The 1996 Telecommunications Act led to fewer independent artists in the Billboard 
Radio Songs Top 50. 
Causal Mechanism: 
The implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act improved the negotiation 
position of labels as mentioned in Hypothesis 1. Independent labels have less resources 
and connections than major labels to approach the few decision makers to convince them 
of their artists (Camel_Knight, 2017). This makes it increasingly difficult for independent 
artist to receive the required playtime to increase their exposure significantly. Therefore 
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the implementation of the Telecommunications Act and the resulting increased 
concentration of radio station ownership led to fewer independent artists considered by 
the programming departments. This decreased diversity as major labels produce the 
majority of music played on the radio. 
Hypothesis 3: The 1996 Telecommunications Act and Bands 
H3: The 1996 Telecommunications Act led to fewer bands in the Billboard Radio Song 
Top 50. 
Causal Mechanism: 
Like the other two hypotheses, Hypothesis 3 is based on the improved negotiation 
position of record labels with radio stations due to the implementation of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act. The costs associated with a solo artist are lower than for a 
band, as some costs such as travel, accommodation and tour costs increase with every 
person associated with an act. Therefore labels increasingly lobby for their solo artists to 
decrease costs, while revenues are not affected by the composition of the musical act. 
This leads to decreased diversity as bands can be seen as more diverse than solo artists.  
 These hypotheses are tested in the analysis chapter of this paper. The following 
chapters will provide context on the 1996 Telecommunications Act and its previously 
researched effects on the market structure and format diversity in the radio industry. 
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2. The History of Radio Regulation before 1996 
This chapter provides an overview of radio regulation in the United States before 
1996. This includes the founding of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), its 
predecessor and implemented regulations.  
The United States of America first started regulating radio broadcasting through a 
dedicated federal agency in 1927. The created agency was called the Federal Radio 
Commission (FRC). The commission was created by the Radio Act of 1927, which had 
the intent to “regulate all forms of interstate and foreign radio transmissions and 
communications within the United States, its Territories and possessions” (69th 
Congress, 1927, p. 1). The FRC received the mandate to serve the public interest, 
convenience and necessity. The mandate to operate in the public interest has been 
remained throughout the existence of the FRC and Federal Communications Commission 
(Huntemann, 1999, p. 394). In the years before the FRC, radio licenses were granted by 
the Secretary of Commerce as established in the Radio Act of 1912. The FRC was 
granted the power to “classify radio stations, assign frequencies and wave-lengths, and 
regulate interference”. (Friedrich & Sternberg, 1943, pp. 798-800). These were the first 
steps in regulating the increasingly popular medium. 
In 1934, with the passing of the Federal Communications Act, the FRC was 
abolished and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was established. This 
was done based on a letter to congress from President Roosevelt. The creation of the FCC 
was done to increase clarity and effectiveness in the relationship of the federal 
government and utility providers. The newly founded FCC took over the responsibilities 
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of the FRC and the Interstate Commerce Commission, which now includes all services 
relying on wires, cables and radio waves for transmission (Roosevelt, 1934). The 
recommendation for the FCC was preceded by various discussions in congress focussing, 
which focussed on five areas of interest. These areas were: broadcasting by congressmen, 
concentration of control, adequacy of service - technical, adequacy of service – 
programming, and censorship and free radio (Friedrich & Sternberg, 1943, pp. 808-815). 
The most relevant issues for the purpose of this paper are the concentration of control and 
the programming adequacy of service.  
Competition has been very important in the US economy, especially guaranteeing 
competition in the radio broadcasting has been deemed important by the congress. This is 
due to the radio being a medium to influence public opinion and it being an instrument 
for politicians to convey their message. It has already been established in the Radio Act 
of 1927 that no licences are to be granted to parties that have acted as an unlawful 
monopoly in a market. The 1934 act further added that a broadcasting license could be 
revoked in case of violation of anti-trust laws. (Friedrich & Sternberg, 1943, pp. 809-
810). The act further included a section that limited the ownership of communication 
facilities with the goal to preserve competition in the industry. (73d Congress. Session II., 
1934, p. 1078). These restrictions have already been amended before the 1996 act to 
allow higher levels of ownership. The limits were first expanded in the early 1980’s to 12 
stations nationwide before further being raised to 18 and later 20 (Sterling, 1997, p. 3).  
The requirement for adequacy of service in terms of programming was included 
in the previously mentioned mandate to serve the public interest, convenience and 
necessity. The main focus herein lies with the definition of the public interest, which was 
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not clearly defined by the 1934 Act (Huntemann, 1999, p. 394). One aspect of the 
adequacy of service in programming was the importance of local culture and its 
representation on radio. There was a concern in congress that without local radio 
broadcasting the culture of the creative centres in Los Angeles and New York would 
overpower local American music, dancing and humour (Friedrich & Sternberg, 1943, p. 
813). The conservation of localism in radio broadcasting was deemed important to act in 
the public interest. 
Already before the 1996 Telecommunications Act, there were many changes to 
radio regulation in the United States aimed at the deregulation of the medium. Over the 
years there have been various changes that led to deregulation. In the 1970’s under 
President Carter, the United States experienced an ideological shift towards the 
deregulation of various industries, as it was generally believed that the free market would 
result in increased efficiency (DiCola & Thomson, 2002, p. 8). The idea was that 
increased competition would result in higher efficiency and more diversity in the radio 
industry. Underperforming actors would be driven out of the market and replaced my 
more efficient entities.  
Increased numbers of radio stations further lead to arguments favouring 
deregulation. The US experienced a constant increase in radio stations over the years. In 
the early 1980’s the FCC decided to increase the number of stations that can operate on 
both the AM and FM bandwidths, which lead to a further increase in broadcasting 
stations (see Table 1: US Radio Stations 1970-2000) (DiCola & Thomson, 2002, p. 8; 
Federal Communications Commission).  
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Table 1: US Radio Stations 1970-20001 
Year AM FM FM Education Total 
1970 4,269 2,083 399 6,751 
1980 4,984 4,372 1,438 10,794 
1990 4,978 4,357 1,435 10,770 
2000 4,685 5,892 2,140 12,717 
 
The rapid increased in the number of radio broadcasters led to the argument that 
the industry has grown to a sufficient level at which the market forces would guarantee 
that stations act in the public interest. Critics also argued that social utility would be 
increased through deregulation and that the radio could therefore better serve the public 
(Fowler & Brenner, 1981-1982, p. 210). 
The increased number of stations also supported the argument that relaxed radio 
regulations would lead to increased format diversity. This argument is mainly based on 
Peter O. Steiner’s 1952 dissertation “Workable Competition in the Radio Broadcasting 
Industry”. Steiner argues that a single owner of various stations would diversify their 
broadcasting to reach the largest audience, while multiple owners might imitate the most 
successful formats, which would lead to duplication of efforts and decreased diversity 
(Sterling, 1997, p. 5). This is in line with the theory of isomorphism, in which 
organisations try to copy other actors that they perceive to be more successful (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983, p. 152). A single owner of various stations was therefore argued to be 
increasing diversity in order to not compete with its own stations. The owners were 
                                                
1 The data for the years 1970, 1980 and 2000 is taken from the FCC and the data for 1990 
from the paper by DiCola & Thomson as it was not available from the FCC 
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expected to use their stations to reach niches and minorities to get the largest possible 
audience in a market. If the single owner did not directly address a niche, it gave the 
competition an opportunity to change their programing to address the niche market and 
therefore increased diversity. With this argument in mind, in 1981, the FCC changed its 
definition of diversity. Before, the FCC guaranteed diversity of broadcasting, as they 
required the broadcasters to vary their broadcasting on a weekly basis. In light of the 
1981 changes, diversity was now only based on the number of broadcasters based in a 
market (Bates & Chambers, 1999, p. 24).  
 In addition to the previously mentioned reasons, the US radio industry was in 
decline. In the 1980’s radio faced increased competition from cable and broadcast 
television. In a study commissioned by the FCC, the situation was shown to be severe, 
with 50% of radio stations being unprofitable. At the turn of the decade, profits for AM 
and FM stations dropped by 50% and 33% respectively (Drushel, 1998, p. 4). This 
increased the pressure on the FCC to further deregulate the radio industry to increase 
efficiency. The radio station owners argued that only by increasing ownership levels, they 
would be able to regain profitability. The inability to spread fixed-costs over various 
stations made it impossible for owners to take advantage of economies of scale. Robert 
F.X. Sillerman of SFX Broadcasting argued that by just adding a second station to the 
portfolio, radio owners could cut costs equal to 25% in the first year. The radio industry 
also hoped for higher revenues as they could reach a bigger share of listeners (Grover, 
1996). 
 The discussion on more lenient ownership caps already began before the first 
changes in the 1980’s. Many large radio broadcasters did not agree with nationwide 
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ownership caps, while local ownership caps were generally accepted. The argument was 
often based on the definition of the relevant market. The radio industry argued that the 
relevant market for competition considerations should be on a local level and not on a 
national level, as they did not see any economic harm in ownership in various regional 
markets (Levi, 2000, p. 586). In order to further support their argument, radio station 
owners argued that the relevant product market also included cable and broadcasting 
television as they provide the same information and entertainment resources. This made 
these media direct competitors for radio stations (Levi, 2000, p. 595). This has guided the 
FCC to gradually increase nationwide ownership caps over the years, with a complete 
eradication of national caps by the 1996 Telecommunications Act. In 1953, station 
owners were allowed to control 7 AM and 7 FM stations nationwide. This limit was first 
increased in 1984 to 12 AM and 12 FM stations. In 1992 and 1994 the FCC increased the 
limits to 18 AM and 18 FM and then to 20 AM and 20 FM respectively. Local ownership 
caps were still in place with 1 AM and 1 FM station until 1992, when the local caps were 
increased to 2 AM and 2 FM in any local market (DiCola & Thomson, 2002, p. 10).  
 The general political viewpoint of deregulation, financial pressure on the radio 
industry, pressure from other media, increased number of actors on the radio and a 
redefinition of the relevant market for competition purposes led finally to the creation and 
implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. The goals were to reduce the 
number of owners, increase profits, increase competition, and provide more diverse 
broadcasting. 
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3. The 1996 Telecommunications Act 
This chapter provides an overview of the changes that were implemented in the 1996 
Telecommunications Act. 
 In 1996, the FCC faced its first major overhaul since its creation in 1934. The 
1996 Act did not only affect radio broadcasting but also other elements of the 
communication spectrum. The goal was to increase competition and to eliminate 
regulatory barriers in order to increase innovation and price competition. Besides the 
changes to radio broadcasting, the Act also affected cable television, telephone services 
and television broadcasters. The biggest change for these sectors was the permission of 
cross-ownership between the sectors. Local telephone services, for example, were now 
allowed to enter the long distance and cable market. (Drushel, 1998, p. 3). 
 The changes to radio broadcasting implemented in the Act affected both 
nationwide and local ownership caps. Nationwide caps have been eliminated completely 
and local caps have been increased drastically compared to the pre-1996 era. The local 
ownership caps were not uniform for all markets anymore, but depend on the number of 
stations active in the market, as can be seen in Table 2: Local Radio Ownership after 
1996 (DiCola & Thomson, 2002, p. 11).  
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Table 2: Local Radio Ownership after 19962 
Market Size Local Ownership Caps 
45 or more stations 8 stations, no more than 5 in same band 
30 - 44 stations 7 stations, no more than 4 in same band 
15 - 29 stations 6 stations, no more than 4 in same band 
Less than 14 stations 5 stations, no more than 3 in same band 
 
The new local ownership limit in a market with more than 45 stations is now 
higher than the nationwide limit was until 1981. There is also an exemption to the local 
caps that states that the limit might be increased if the number of radio stations is 
increased (Sterling, 1997, p. 4). This refers to exceeding the local limits through a newly 
given licence and not through the merger with another broadcaster. 
 The new ownership caps were not the only changes affecting radio broadcasting 
in the 1996 Telecommunications Act. The act also included an extension of the license 
term from seven to eight years. The license term has previously been extended in 1981 
from 3 years to seven. The extension does not have a large effect on competition in the 
industry, but the 1996 Act furthermore changed the process of renewing a license. Pre-
1996, radio stations had to renew their licenses with the FCC, which was often a costly 
process. In the new FCC regulations however, radio stations are guaranteed to have their 
license renewed, called “renewal expectancy”, if they are serving the public interest, have 
not seriously violated any rules or shown a “pattern of abuse” (Sterling, 1997, p. 2). If 
                                                
2 With no single owner being allowed to own more than 50% of stations in a market. In a 
local market with 9 stations, the local ownership cap is 4 stations, instead of the 5 shown 
in Table 2: Local Radio Ownership after 1996 
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these conditions are not met, the FCC can deny the renewal or grant reduced license 
terms based on certain conditions that have to be met. This new process heightened the 
entry-barriers for new stations drastically. Before 1996, already established stations had 
to compete for their license with new applicants. This process has now been suspended 
and even if there has been an infringement of the regulations, the FCC was not allowed to 
consider new applicants until the renewal has been formally denied (Sterling, 1997, p. 3). 
 In order to monitor the developments in the communications sector, the 1996 
Telecommunications Act also included biennial reviews. These are used to see whether 
the changes had the desired effects of increased competition and diversity. These reviews 
however have not led to any changes in ownership caps in the timeframe examined in this 
thesis (Federal Communications Commission, 2016). 
The implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act has eliminated all national 
ownership caps and drastically increased local ownership limits. The Act further 
introduced renewal expectancy, which leads to the automatic renewal of an existing 
station’s license if it serves the public interest and has not violated any rules by the FCC. 
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4. The Effects of the 1996 Telecommunications Act on the 
Radio Industry 
This chapter outlines the effects the 1996 Telecommunications Act had on the market 
structure and format diversity in the radio industry. The effects are categorised on a 
national, local and format level.  
The implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act led to an immediate surge 
in mergers and acquisitions of radio stations. Within days after the act was passed on 
February 8th, Jacor acquired Citicasters Inc. and the Noble Broadcast Group Inc. for $774 
million. Through the acquisition of Noble, Jacor became the first company to reach the 
local ownership cap of 8 stations (Petrozello & Rathbun, 1996). The acquisition of 
Granum Holdings LP’s 12 stations by the Infinity Broadcasting Corp. for $410 million 
set a new record for a single radio-only transaction less than one month after the 
Telecommunications Act was passed. This acquisition increased Infinity’s holdings to 46 
stations. Another notable transaction was the acquisition of U.S. Radion’s 13 stations 
through Clear Channel Communications Inc. for $140 million, which boosted them to 52 
stations nationwide (Petrozello & Rathbun, 1996). These acquisitions happened 
immediately after the Act and the development further continued throughout 1999, after 
which the number of mergers started to slow down. 
Various studies have identified the emergence of oligopolies in both the national and 
local markets and in form of format oligopolies (DiCola & Thomson, 2002, p. 17). 
Format oligopolies occur when few owners have significant holdings across radio 
formats, such as Top 40 or Country. Most researchers agree on the development of 
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national and local oligopolies, but provide different measures (DiCola, 2006) (DiCola & 
Thomson, 2002) (Wirth, 2007). The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) 
however disagrees with the evaluation of the radio industry as a national oligopoly. The 
NAB publicly contested DiCola’s findings in a press release. The NAB argues that radio 
is one of the least consolidated mediums with almost 4,000 individual station owners. 
They further use music labels, movie studios and cable TV providers as example for 
more consolidated industries, since between 5-10 companies in these markets account for 
84%, 99%, and 89% of revenues in their fields respectively. In contrast, the NAB argues 
that the top ten radio owners only account for 49% of industry revenues nationwide 
(National Association of Broadcasters, 2002).  
The effects on format diversity are more contested, as different researchers use 
different variables for their studies (DiCola, 2006) (DiCola & Thomson, 2002) (Chipty, 
2007). Some researchers further argue that an increase in formats in local markets does 
not represent diversity of programming due to large overlaps between the formats 
(DiCola, 2006, p. 7). The effects on music programming diversity based on different 
artists in the Billboard Radio Songs Top 50 is analysed in the analysis chapter. 
4.1. National Radio Ownership Concentration 
This section provides information on radio consolidation on a national level resulting 
from the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its effects on advertising prices and 
listenership ratings. 
In order to assess competition in a market one has to first define the relevant market. 
This includes both the geographic and product market. These are the two relevant 
markets the European Commission and the US Federal Trade Commission use in 
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evaluating mergers. The definition of the relevant market helps to more precisely define 
the competition problem and helps to gain a preliminary assessment. The competition 
authority defines the relevant market by considering all products or services that can be 
used as a substitute (Bishop & Walker, 2010, p. 109). 
The geographic market for radio broadcasting in this case is the United States of 
America. The definition of the product market is however slightly more complex. The 
FCC in their 2002 Biennial consider the radio advertising market, radio listening market 
and radio program production market to be the relevant markets for the analysis of 
competition problems (Federal Communications Commission, 2002, pp. 96-99). There 
have been some discussions on whether television broadcasting and cable are to be 
considered effective substitutes for radio, with which the FCC disagrees in its Biennial 
reviews (National Association of Broadcasters, 2002) (Federal Communications 
Commission, 2002). Their decisions are based on various studies that state that these 
three markets are distinct from other media such as television and newspapers and 
therefore only radio is included in the relevant product market definition. DiCola also 
based the analysis on the advertising and listener share as well as ownership of stations to 
calculate concentration levels (2002 & 2006).  
The national ownership levels clearly show that radio broadcasting has developed 
into an oligopoly after 1996. In 1997, the largest owner of radio stations was Capstar 
Broadcasting Partners with 299 stations nationwide. In the same year, the 10 largest 
holdings owned 1,128 stations of the 10,257 commercial stations (DiCola & Thomson, 
2002, p. 21; Chipty, 2007, pp. 6-7). Eight years later, in 2005, the largest national owner 
of radio stations was Clear Channel Communications, owning 1,183 stations, which is 
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more than the largest 10 owned in 1997. The top 10 in 2005 now owned 2,400 stations, 
which represents 22 percent of all stations. (Chipty, 2007, p. 7). This does not represent a 
nationwide oligopoly based on ownership, but shows that there are a few large players 
and many smaller players. These smaller players however faced increased dangers of 
acquisition. The number of owners experienced a decline of 39% between 1996 and 
2007. Before the wave of mergers and acquisition, there were 5,133 individual owners. 
This number has declined to 3,121 in 2007 (Williams, 2007, p. 5). Radio broadcasting 
with the relevant geographic market being the whole United States measured on 
ownership levels leads to the conclusion that there is no ownership oligopoly, but that 
concentration of ownership has increased.  
Besides the measuring concentration based on ownership levels, the literature also 
analyses whether there is a nationwide oligopoly based on advertising revenue. Due to 
large differences in market size and their demographics, some stations can charge higher 
prices for their advertising slots. As can be seen in Table 3: Top Five Owners by 
Estimated Revenue Share, the top five commercial station owners have revenues of 
53.10% of all stations, while only holding a market share of just under 15%.  
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Table 3: Top Five Owners by Estimated Revenue Share 
Name  Number of Stations 3 Revenue Share4 Station Market Share 
Clear Channel  1,183  26.30% 10.9% 
Infinity  178  16.30% 1.6% 
Cox Radio  78  3.60% 0.7% 
Entercom  85  3.50% 1.0% 
ABC/Disney  71  3.40% 0.7% 
Total:  1,595  53.10% 14.9% 
 
The large share of revenues by the 5 highest earners is pointing towards an 
oligopoly in radio broadcasting, with a revenue share of over 50%. In order to better 
understand the market concentration, DiCola (2006) calculates the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) as well as the concentration ratios for the 2, 4 and 10 largest actors, denoted 
CR2, CR4 and CR10 respectively for the years 1993-2004 as shown in Figure 1: 
Commercial Radio Revenue Concentration. The concentration ratios in Figure 1 as well 
as Table 3 however do not take the relative size of the companies or the total number of 
actors into account, which makes the HHI a more complete measurement of market 
concentration (Bishop & Walker, 2010, p. 67). As can be seen in Figure 1, there has been 
a steep increase after the implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act in all four 
measures. A flattening or decline of the measures follows the steep increase after 2000. 
The HHI at its peak reached 1166 before it decreased slightly to 1046 in 2004. This is not 
an excessively high number, but high enough to raise concerns regarding future mergers 
in the industry. The justice department considers industries with a HHI of 1000-1800 to 
                                                
3 The number of stations and the market share are taken from Chipty (2007) Table 2 for 
the year 2005. The station data was not available for 2004, but the market share data has 
not changed significantly between 2004 and 2005 
4 The revenue share is taken from DiCola (2006) Table 1-4 for the year 2004.  
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be concentrated. The radio broadcasting reached a level above 1000 as measured by the 
HHI in 1999 (DiCola, 2006, p. 42).  
Figure 1: Commercial Radio Revenue Concentration5 
 
The concerns with a highly concentrated industry are that it leads to increased 
prices as compared to perfect competition. There has been previous research regarding 
the price levels of advertising based on various markets (Chipty, 2007). The research 
differentiates between cost per point (“CPP”) and cost per thousand (“CPM”). CPP 
represents the advertising costs to reach 1% of the listeners, while CPM measures the 
costs of reaching 1000 listeners is a market. The AM drive should not be confused with 
the radio band AM, but stands for the morning rush hour, during which the costs are the 
highest. (Chipty, 2007, p. 39). The results are displayed in Figure 2: Advertising Prices 
based on HHI. It is visible that the CPP decreases with increased competition, this is 
                                                
5 DiCola (2006) used the Media Access Pro database by BIA Financial Networks, which 
is a commercial database and therefore not accessible to the researcher of this paper. 
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according to Chipty (2007) due to the fact that more highly concentrated markets tend to 
be smaller and reaching an additional percentage point can be achieved at lower costs. 
The local ownership caps allow only up to 8 stations in a market with 45 or more stations 
but up to 5 stations in markets with below 14 total stations, which represents 35%-50% in 
the smallest markets and 18% in the largest markets. There is however an increase in all 
three CPP categories, for HHI values above 3,000. This can lead to the conclusion that 
advertising prices increase slightly in markets with very high concentration. The CPM 
increases steadily with increased concentration of market power, during morning rush 
hours, the evening and the daily average. This leads to show that increased market 
concentration in a radio broadcasting market leads to higher advertising costs. This holds 
true for both radio bands as well as only FM stations.  
Figure 2: Advertising Prices based on HHI6 
 
Chipty (2007) further conducts a regression analysis based on all stations using Equation 
1: Market Level Regression with Demographics (Chipty, 2007, p. 21). 
                                                
6 The data is complied by Chipty (2007) by using the FCC Ownership Database, Edison 
Airplay Database and SQAD. The last to databases are commercial databases, which 
made it not possible for me to access the data directly. 
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Equation 1: Market Level Regression with Demographics 
 
In this equation, HHIi represents the ownership HHI, Stationsi is the number of 
stations, HHI-x-Stations is the interaction term to control for the effect of concentration 
in different sized markets, Stations² is the number of stations squared, Local Newspaperi 
and Local Televisioni are stations that are commonly owned by a newspaper or TV 
channel. National Radioi is the total number of radio stations the owner in market i owns 
nationally. The Outcomei in this case measured is advertising prices. Demographics 
includes various characteristics, such as total population, number of retail establishments 
and racial diversity that predict station outcomes (Chipty, 2007, pp. 21-22). Using these 
parameters, Chipty runs an OLS regression. The results can be found in Figure 3: Market 
Level Regression Estimating Effects on Advertising Prices. The results estimate that 
there is no significant correlation for market concentration and advertising prices. The 
increase of stations in a market however shows a significant negative correlation between 
the number of stations and the price of advertising. An additional radio station in the 
market represents increased competition that leads to decreased advertising prices as 
radio stations lower their prices to attract more advertisements. 
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Figure 3: Market Level Regression Estimating Effects on Advertising Prices7 
 
The advertising revenue share, as previously mentioned depends strongly on the 
size of a market and the share of listeners a radio broadcaster reaches. This in turn 
depends on the strength and location of the antenna. With an increase of radio stations per 
owner, the share of listeners also increases. The popularity of a radio station depends 
besides the location or size of the market also on other factors. These factors are the type 
and quality of radio programming, the frequency, personal preferences and the 
advertising a radio stations airs. The listener share of the ten largest stations can be seen 
in Figure 4: Listener Share 2005. Arbitron (now Nielson) gathers this type of data. The 
percentages are based on the number of people listening to a radio station for at least 5 
minutes within a fifteen-minute period, (DiCola, 2006, pp. 38-39). Figure 4 shows that 
the five largest station owners reach 51% of all listeners in the United States and the 10 
largest owners reach almost two-third of all listeners. Besides the 2005 figures, there is 
no additional information available on how this has developed. It can however be 
assumed that Clear Channel could not have reached 27.2% of all listeners with the 
allowed maximum of 40 stations before 1996 (DiCola, 2006, p. 41).  
                                                
7 See footnote 5 for data sources. Asterisk shows significance at 5% level. 
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Figure 4: Listener Share 20058 
 
Besides listenership’s relation to possible advertising revenue, listenership can 
also be used as a proxy for radio consolidation’s effect on public welfare. Chipty (2007, 
p. 41) argues that if consolidation leads to a decrease in programming quality, people 
spend less time listening to the radio and vice versa. The argument is based on the 
assumption that listeners would switch to other media to replace radio. This is tracked 
using the so-called average quarter hour or AQH ratings for adults 18 and older. These 
AQHs are based on diaries conducted by Arbitron, in which respondents track if they 
have listened to the radio and for how long (Chipty, 2007, p. 15). Figure 5: Listenership 
by HHI shows that markets with higher market concentrations have greater listenership. 
Overall listenership in concentrated markets is higher than in less concentrated markets, 
                                                
8 Figure taken from DiCola (2006, p. 40). The data again is taken from BIA Financial 
Networks 
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even though there are fewer radio stations available (Chipty, 2007, p. 42). This might be 
due to the fact that in higher concentrated markets, fewer alternatives to broadcast radio 
are available, as these are usually smaller markets and less metropolitan.  
Figure 5: Listenership by HHI9 
 
Chipty further conducts an OLS regression showing the effects of the radio 
ownership structure on listenership, as can be seen in Figure 6: Effect of Ownership 
Structure on Listenership.  
Figure 6: Effect of Ownership Structure on Listenership10 
 
The results suggest that increased concentration in ownership does not have a 
significant effect on listenership. It can therefore be argued that people do not stop 
listening to the radio when the concentration in their market increases. The data suggests 
that listenership however does increase if the local stations are owned by a large national 
station owner. Whether this is due to increased programming quality however is beyond 
the scope of the data and this research. A survey conducted by DiCola and Thomson 
                                                
9 Taken from Chipty (2007, Table 33) 
10 Taken from Chipty (2007, Table 34) 
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however suggest that 29% of the people interviewed, said that they listen more to the 
radio than they did 5 years ago, while another 29% of the interviewees answered that they 
listen to the radio less. Amongst the 29% listening less, only 21% indicated that they do 
not like the music on the radio anymore (DiCola & Thomson, 2002, pp. 69-72). 
The existing literature shows that the implementation of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act led to increased ownership concentration on a national level. 
While the ownership concentration has increased, it cannot be called an oligopoly. The 
largest five owners based on revenue only own 14.9% of all stations as seen in Table 3. 
Research by Chipty shows that increased ownership concentration does not have a 
significant effect on advertising prices. Due to the large differences in station reach and 
audience however, ownership concentration is not the most appropriate definition. The 
effects on advertising prices should therefore be further researched based on other 
concentration measures, this is however outside the scope of this paper. When 
considering the concentration based on listenership, one can see that the largest five 
stations reach just over 50% of all radio listeners. The same can be said for the 
concentration of advertising revenues, where the top five stations earn about 53% of the 
national revenue. It can therefore be concluded that the 1996 Telecommunications Act 
did not result in an ownership oligopoly in the radio industry. The Act however did lead 
to an oligopoly based on revenues and listenership. 
4.2. Local Ownership Concentration 
The 1996 Telecommunications Act did not only remove nationwide ownership caps 
in the radio industry, but also increased local ownership caps substantially. Before 1992, 
any one owner was allowed to own a maximum of 1 AM and 1 FM in any local market. 
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The local ownership caps were first increased in 1992 to allow owners to control up to 4 
stations but no more than 2 AM and 2 FM stations in any local market. The local markets 
were defined using the FCC’s Single-Contour Market Definition. The FCC used this 
approach from 1992 until 2004. Local markets were based on station clusters in areas 
with a lot of overlap (DiCola, 2006, p. 61). This can be seen in Figure 7. Each cluster 
defines one local market. After 2004, the FCC changed its market definition to represent 
the Arbitron metropolitan areas, which redefined a local market based on geographic 
boundaries. All the clusters in Figure 7 could now be within a single market, if they 
happen to be in the same geographic metropolitan. The changes in the definition led to 
surpassing of the local ownership caps in 104 of the 297 Arbitron markets. The excessive 
holdings are grandfathered into the new market definition and radio station owners do not 
have to divest from their holdings in these markets (DiCola, 2006, p. 62).  
Figure 7: Signal-Contour Market Definition11 
 
                                                
11 Taken from DiCola (2006) p. 61 
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In 1996, the FCC changed its 2 AM and 2 FM local station ownership rule and 
increased it to limits based on local market size, as can be seen in Table 2: Local Radio 
Ownership after 1996. Besides the ownership caps in Table 2, no single owner was 
allowed to own more than 50% of stations in the local market. This was also a slight 
change compared to 1992. Pre-1996, owners were allowed to own up to 50%, while the 
1996 Act allowed ownership to no more than 50%. This now allows stations to own 50% 
of station, while before the Act the limit was less than 50% (DiCola, 2006, p. 59). The 
new ownership caps allow for more concentration in all local markets. 
The changes in concentration on a local level are analysed by Drushel (1998). In his 
research of the 50 largest US radio markets as defined by Arbitron, the research shows an 
HHI increase from 717.23 in the spring of 1992 to an HHI of 1423.65 in the spring of 
1997 (Drushel, 1998, p. 12). The HHI represents ownership concentration in these 
markets. Using the standard definition of the HHI, values below 1000 can be interpreted 
as unconcentrated, 1000-1800 represents a concentrated market and values above 1800 
represent heavy concentration. In the research, Drushel finds that in 1992 there were 41 
unconcentrated markets and 9 concentrated markets. In 1997 there were 7 
unconcentrated, 32 concentrated and 11 heavily concentrated local markets amongst the 
largest 50 US radio markets. He concludes that concentration in almost all, except three 
markets increased. The increased concentration can be found across all market sizes 
(Drushel, 1998, p. 13). 
DiCola (2006) expands this research into local ownership concentration by looking at 
all 297 Arbitron markets. The markets are categorized into 12 groups, based on the 
population range and the local concentration share (LCS). The LCS represents the share 
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of listeners that listen to stations in their defined home market. In small markets, people 
often prefer the radio stations from larger neighbouring market. Another reason for 
people to listen to stations outside their defined home market is the overlap of market as 
can be seen in Figure 7. Here clusters 2 and 3, and 4 and 5 overlap. In these places people 
might listen to stations that are outside their home market (DiCola, 2006, p. 54). Using 
population size and LCS ranges, all stations are classified into groups as can be seen in 
Figure 8. 
Figure 8: Arbitron Market Classification12 
 
Using these 12 groups, DiCola researches the changes in concentration based on a 
listenership HHI and advertising revenue HHI from 1996 until 2005. In 1996 the 
listenership HHI in the different groups ranges from 616 in Group 12 to 2214 in Group 8. 
The concentration in 1996 is already relatively high with only groups 12, 1 and 11 being 
below a HHI of 1000. In 2005 however all 12 groups have a listenership HHI above 
1000. The lowest and highest HHI can still be found in groups 12 and 8, respectively with 
1396 and 3634. Steadily increasing concentration can be observed in all markets from 
                                                
12 Taken from DiCola (2006) p. 55 
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1996-2005 (DiCola, 2006, p. 68). The listenership concentration measured by the HHI 
exceeds 1800 in 232 of the 297 Arbitron markets. 
An analysis by DiCola based on the revenue share measured HHI provides similar 
results suggesting increased concentration in all market groups. These developments 
include data from 1993-2004. The revenue based HHI ranged from 840 (Group 1) to 
5017 (Group 10) in 1993. These values increase to a range of 1646 (Group 12) to 5533 
(Group 10) in 2004. Overall 281 of the 297 Arbitron markets have a HHI above 1800 in 
2004 (DiCola, 2006, pp. 67-68).  
These three research papers show that there has been increased concentration in the 
US radio industry on a local level. HHI based on ownership, listenership and revenue 
share all increase throughout all local markets after the implementation of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act.  
4.3.  Format Oligopolies 
This section reviews the effects of the 1996 Telecommunications Act on format 
diversity on the radio. Format diversity does not concern itself with ownership, listener 
ratings or revenue concentration of stations, but with the similarities or differences 
between various radio formats and their control by station owners. There is quite some 
research trying to understand the effects of the Telecommunications Act on format 
diversity (Wirth, 2001) (DiCola & Thomson, 2002) (DiCola, 2006) (Chipty, 2007) 
(Wirth, 2007). The two papers by Wirth focus on the ownership concentration of radio 
formats in the United States, which is also discussed in the papers by DiCola. The paper 
by Chipty analyses whether increased format concentration has an effect on the number 
of formats offered in a market. DiCola’s papers from 2002 and 2006 further analyse if 
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format variety also represents programming diversity. This analysis shows whether there 
has been increased overlap amongst the various formats. The papers by DiCola therefore 
do not only focus on the diversity of formats that are offered but also the diversity 
between those formats. 
In his 2001 paper, Wirth identifies ten nationwide format oligopolies. These 
oligopolies are documented, when over 50% of radio listeners in a specific format are 
reached by four station groups (Wirth, 2001, p. 249). The creation of a format oligopoly 
has various advantages for station owners. The owner groups can save money on format 
research and centralize the decision making process in the programming departments, as 
they do not have to employ a director in every station. This development has been 
confirmed in the conducted interview, in which the interviewee says that the 
programming director of his station was responsible for various stations in different 
markets (Camel_Knight, 2017). The concentration does not only create cost savings 
when centralizing the programming decisions, these savings can also be achieved, by 
only focusing on certain formats (Wirth, 2001, pp. 251-252). In other words, a station 
owner can reduce costs by focussing on only a few formats and by acquiring as many 
stations as possible in these formats. By focussing on certain formats, the stations can 
increase their knowledge and the associated audiences of these formats, and become 
more efficient. Wirth however also argues that there are disadvantages to this strategy, as 
radio is still dominantly a local business (Wirth, 2001, p. 253). This might be true for 
factors such as advertising sales, but does not seem to be true for the programming 
departments. The interviewee Camel_Knight responds largely negative on the question 
whether local artists were of interest to the programming departments and offers an 
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example of a project to promote local artists, which was shut down by Clear Channel 
(Camel_Knight, 2017). 
Wirth finds ten format oligopolies in the fourteen examined station formats in 1991, 
based on an ownership level of over 50% by the four largest station groups. The formats 
are based on the Arbitron designations and based on the fourteen most popular formats. 
The research shows ownership levels ranging from 53%-74%13 by the four largest 
owners in these formats (Wirth, 2001, pp. 255-256). DiCola and Thomson expand the 
research in 2002. In the research, DiCola and Thomson examine both the format 
consolidation based on the stations self-reported formats and the formats categories used 
by the Media Access Pro database (DiCola & Thomson, 2002, pp. 37-38). Their findings 
suggest that there is a format oligopoly in 28 of the Top 30 self-reported music formats 
and in 17 of the 19 Media Access Pro categories by BIA Financial Networks. The results 
can be seen in Figure 9 and Figure 10. 
                                                
13 Top 40: 63%, Country: 56%, Oldies: 56%, Soft Rock/Lite Rock: 56%, Hot Adult 
Contemporary: 62%, Urban 58%, Rock: 59%, Adult Album Alternative: 53%, Adult 
Standards: 54%, 70s: 74%.  
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Figure 9: Top 4 Ownership Share in Top 30 Self-Reported Formats14 
 
  
                                                
14 Taken from DiCola & Thomson (2002), p. 37 
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Figure 10: Top 4 Ownership Share in 19 BIA Formats15 
 
This shows that only a few companies control a majority of the radio formats. 
This makes economic sense for the station owners, as it lets them take advantage of the 
economics of scale previously mentioned. Wirth further expands on these developments 
in his paper from 2007. The purpose of the paper is to see if the trend of format 
oligopolies has continued. The research is further expanded to now include 26 formats. 
The research shows that this was indeed the trend. The results of Wirth, Format 
Monopolies: The Evolution of "Nationwide Format Oligopolies", 2007 show that there 
are five formats that can now be considered a monopoly, seven formats that can be 
considered duopolies and thirdteen formats that constitute an oligopoly in 200516. The 
five formats that can be considered a monopoly can be seen in Figure 11. 
                                                
15 Taken from DiCola & Thomson (2002), p. 38 
16 Wirth used Spring 2005 data from BIA Financial Networks 
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Figure 11: Format Monopolies17 
 
The results show that Clear Channel Communications has a monopoly in four of the 
five monopolized markets in 2005. This is not surprising as Clear Channel is the single 
largest station owner. Clear Channel is also part of a duopoly in five of the seven 
identified markets (Appendix 2). 
The research clearly shows that there has been increased consolidation of radio 
formats (DiCola & Thomson, 2002) (Wirth, 2001) (Wirth, 2007). This was to be 
expected regarding the economics of scale that can be achieved through format 
concentration. 
The previous papers mainly focus on ownership in certain formats, but do not offer 
empirical evidence for the concentration’s effect on content diversity. Chipty (2007) 
empirically analyses if increased concentration leads to more formats offered in the 
markets. This is based on Steiner’s (1952) argument that a single owner would increase 
the variety of formats in order to not compete with itself. Chipty uses three different 
datasets for his analysis. The formats are defined based on the BIA Financial Networks 
                                                
17 Taken from Wirth (2007), page 151 
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database. Format 101 represents the 101 reported formats, Format 20 combines the 101 
formats into 20 less narrowly defined categories and Format 11 represents eleven more 
broadly defined categories that minimize the overlap of the Format 20 formats (Chipty, 
2007, pp. 7-8). The resulting effects can be seen in Figure 12. 
Figure 12: Effects of Ownership Structure on Formats18 
 
The dependent variables represented as HHI in the table are based on the format 
concentration in the various formats. The results suggest that increased ownership 
concentration leads to a lower format HHI. This means that increased ownership in a 
market results in lower format pile-up. Format pile-up is when there is high concentration 
in a format, meaning various stations competing in the same format. This means that in 
markets with higher ownership concentration, the stations are more spread out over the 
various formats. The results further suggest that the number of formats in a market 
increases with every additional station. This is in line with Steiner’ argumentation that 
increased concentration leads to less format overlap, as the station owners try to reach 
every audience in every format. It is therefore argued that increased concentration leads 
to more diversity in radio formats. 
DiCola & Thomson (2002) however argue that format variety does not imply 
programming diversity. Format variety is defined as the number of different formats 
                                                
18 The table is taken from Chipty (2007), Table 11. 
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available in a defined market. DiCola & Thomson however introduce three factors that 
the definition is not sufficient to analyse diversity. These factors are faux-mat variety, 
format homogeneity and format redundancy (DiCola & Thomson, 2002, p. 42). Faux-mat 
variety is defined as changes in reported formats that do not represent changes in 
programming. This might be done for marketing purposes to redefine a format to appeal 
to a larger audience. This is closely related to format homogeneity. This is defined as the 
overlap in programming across formats. This is especially true for closely related formats 
such as Urban and Hip-Hop. There are songs in different genres, like rap that fit both 
formats’ programming. Format redundancy is similar to format pile-up, but does not 
consider all stations in the same format, but only the stations owned by the same radio 
group. 
Due to the direct relation of faux-mat variety and format homogeneity, these two 
factors can be measured together in term of the overlap between formats. DiCola 
conducts research into playlist overlap between formats in both his 2002 paper with 
Thomson and again in 2006. The overlaps are measured based on Radio and Records’ 
chart formats (DiCola, 2006, p. 100). The Radio and Records chart formats are similar to 
the BIA formats and have been fitted in a Venn diagram to visualize the overlap between 
formats in May 2006 as seen in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13: Overlap between Radio Formats19 
 
The diagram shows that there is a lot of overlap between various formats, 
especially in the rock and contemporary formats. Large overlaps, such as between CHR-
Rhythmic and Urban can be seen as faux-mat variety, as out of the Top 50, both formats 
only have 13 and 14 songs that are not present in the others playlist. The analysis of the 
                                                
19 Taken from DiCola (2006) p. 100 
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overlap is furthermore conducted in 4-year steps between 1994 and 2006 to see if this 
development was due to the 1996 Telecommunications Act. The results can be seen in 
Figure 14. 
Figure 14: Format Pairs with the Highest Percentage Overlap20 
 
The results show that there is significant overlap between some formats and that it has 
increased over the years. DiCola therefore argues that diversity in radio programming has 
decreased as a result of increased overlap between radio formats. There is also further 
research into the overlap between stations by the same owner in the same format. The 
results from 2006 can be seen in Figure 15. 
                                                
20 Taken from DiCola (2006), p. 101 
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Figure 15: Overlap between Stations by Same Owner in Same Format21 
 
The figure has to be interpreted as the overlap between two stations by the same 
owner in the same format. These are averages between all stations per owner in one 
format. There are overlaps of up to 93% between playlists by stations controlled by the 
same radio group. The figure therefore can be interpreted as the overlap of any two 
stations across the country owned by the same owner group in the same format. This 
would mean for example for Clear Channel that all stations in the Urban format share on 
average 54.6% of their playlist. This is not surprising regarding the centralization of 
programming that has developed to achieve economics of scale. These findings are also 
supported in the interview with the former radio DJ Camel_Knight. The playlists of radio 
stations are created by the programming directors responsible for a set of stations. This is 
                                                
21 Taken from DiCola (2006), p. 107 
The 1996 Telecommunications Act and the Radio Industry 
Leiden University  53 
done using a list of songs provided by Clear Channel’s corporate office with ratings for 
the songs. The programming directors are required to play the top songs once an hour, 
silver songs every two hours and bronze songs every three hours. Assuming that every 
programming director receives a similar list, the overlap is easily explained. Other songs 
could only be included in the programming if they were previous hits or currently in the 
Top 40, which further narrows the selection of songs and increases possible overlap 
(Camel_Knight, 2017). 
Overall, scholars agree that the implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act 
led to increased concentration in format ownership, the effects however are more 
contested. While Chipty argues that increased concentration led to more format diversity, 
DiCola argues that format diversity is a flawed measure for true diversity. This argument 
is mainly made based on the large overlap of the radio formats. This paper introduces 
further measures for diversity on the radio, based on the number of artists, independent 
artists and bands on the radio in Chapter 5.2. 
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5. Data Collection and Research Design 
This chapter provides explanations for the data and research methods used in the 
analysis. The Data Collection chapter explains how the data has been gathered, followed 
by the Research Design chapter explaining the methods used in the analysis. 
5.1. Data Collection 
The data was gathered from the Billboard Radio Songs Top 50 between 1991 and 
2005. This time frame is chosen as it provides sufficient data for the time before and after 
the 1996 Telecommunications Act to study its effects. The time frame after the Act was 
chosen because after 2005, more alternatives to radio emerged that made the discovery of 
new music and publishing by artists easier. The upper limit 2005 was before the 
emergence of services such as YouTube, Spotify and SoundCloud, which were founded 
in 2005, 2006 and 2007 respectively (Crunchbase). Satellite radio services already 
existed before, but since they are paid services that require additional hardware, they 
cannot be seen as direct substitute to radio broadcasting. The most prominent provider in 
the United States is SiriusXM, which was founded in 1990. The costs of a SiriusXM 
subscription are currently $11-$20 per month, do not make it an efficient substitute for 
AM and FM radio as they are provided free of charge (SiriusXM). The same can be said 
about cable broadcasting, while cable also provides a platform to discover new music, the 
channels can only be received on a TV at home. Access to cable radio is furthermore 
bundled with cable TV and costs a monthly subscription fee. The illegal P2P 
downloading platform Napster was founded in 1999, but it was more likely used to 
substitute CD purchases and its main function was not the discovery of new music but the 
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download of already known songs. The same can be said for digital music providers such 
as the iTunes Store. The iTunes Store was first released in 2003. Similarly to Napster and 
other P2P file-sharing platforms, its main function is the distribution of music and not the 
promotion. The store also does not provide music free of charge; users have to pay per 
song, which makes it an unlikely platform to look for new music. Television channels 
such as MTV and VH1 were founded in 1981 and 1985 respectively, but also should not 
be seen as substitutes for radio. While they provide a platform for discovering new music, 
they are not available in the car or on the move such as radio. The costs of releasing new 
music through these stations are furthermore significantly higher than through the radio. 
While radio broadcasting only requires audio, TV music channels need a music video, 
which has to be produced edited and synced with the audio track. Brick-and-mortar 
record retailers are another platform for people to find new music as well as for 
musicians to promote their music. These stores, besides the big-box stores, are however 
extremely local and less convenient than radio. These stores are increasingly substituted 
through digital retailers such as iTunes, which has meanwhile become the largest music 
retailer in the United States (Passman, 2014, p. 70). The emergence of digital retailers 
further decreased the need of a distribution deal with major labels, as there is no need for 
manufacturing plants, warehouses, etc. This is another reason 2005 is chosen as last year 
of the analysis to control for changes in distribution practices. In conclusion, the upper 
boundary in 2005 is chosen to minimize the interference of new platforms for both artists 
and listeners as well as new distribution methods that might affect the independent 
variables. 
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The data gathered from the Billboard Radio Song Top 50 includes the airplay of 
all genres across the United States. The decision was made to use these charts instead of 
genre specific data to get a better overview of the overall effects on the music industry in 
contrast to only certain genres. Another reason is that as previously mentioned the 
increased homogeneity of music formats, which make it more difficult to categorize 
certain singles. The data is gathered at three points every year. The first chart sample is 
analyzed at the beginning of February of every year. This spot is chosen as it is after 
Christmas, which might influence the airplay figures, as Christmas songs can be played 
further into January. Another reason is that it is shortly before the SXSW, which is an 
annual conference and festival celebrating the convergence of the interactive, film and 
music industries (SXSW). SXSW attracted 512 showcasing artists in 1991 and grew to 
over 1330 in 2005 and is a prime location for artists to gain exposure (SXSW). The 
second data point is 5 months later; the last charts in May. This point is taken as the 
singles released before and SXSW are established in the charts at this point (Rogers, 
2014). The last data point is 3 months later; the first charts in September. At this time 
there are new releases before the CMJ Music Marathon and because May and August are 
considered the ideal time for releases for both emerging and established artists (Rogers, 
2014). There is another 5-month gap until the February sample for the following year, 
which again is chosen to account for the seasonal influence of Christmas music. The 
collected data from the three data points is then aggregated into yearly data. This is done 
by adding the number of songs of each artist from the three data points to get 150 songs 
per year.  
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The data is as previously mentioned taken from the Billboard Radio Songs Top 
50, which provide the artist and name of the single. Using this information, a data sheet is 
created for all samples including the artists’ names and the number of singles each artist 
has at that point in time. Using the provided names of the artists it is then determined 
whether the act was a solo artist or a band, which is recorded with a dummy variable (0= 
Solo, 1= Duo/ Trio/ Band). Collaborating artists that do not form a band in the sense of 
an album released together are included as individual artists. These so called joint 
recordings usually also provide payment to the artists based on their proportional share. A 
duet would split the royalties 50/50 (Passman, 2014, p. 161). An example would be 
“Somebody To Love” by Jon B. featuring Babyface. Both artists are listed individually as 
they usually release music as solo artists. The reason is that it provides airplay for both 
artists, who might have solo singles in the Top 50 at the same time. The decision is also 
made on the basis that a song by more than one artist also increases the exposure for all 
artists involved. In cases were two artists or more collaborated on an album together, they 
are considered a band for songs released under that album, but as solo artists for all other 
songs. This is for example the case for Lil’ Jon in 2004. He released a solo song as well 
as a song with The East Side Boyz. Lil’ Jon & The East Side Boyz is considered a band 
as they released an album and multiple singles together, but Lil’ Jon also released solo 
songs during that periode. Both are therefor added as separate artists in the data.  
Using the artist’s name and single, it is determined if the release was done under a 
major label or by an independent label. The information was collected from Discogs.com. 
Discogs is a user generated database and marketplace for vinyl and CD recordings and 
provides information on release dates and labels as well as the parent companies of the 
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labels. The current database includes over 8.4 million recordings and 5.0 million artists 
(Discogs). The categorization of the labels is based on the major label classification 
scheme in Appendix 1 of Radio Deregulation: Has It Served Citizens and Musicians? 
(DiCola & Thomson, 2002, pp. Appendix I-1 - I11). The categorization includes labels 
from 1992 to 2001. The categorization as independent or non-independent for the years 
before 1992 and after 2001 is done using the information provided by Discogs. DiCola & 
Thomson’s classification scheme furthermore only includes US American labels and is 
missing a categorization for foreign labels, which is also done using Discogs. The labels 
not included in DiCola & Thomson’s paper are classified based on label information on 
Discogs and the corporate websites. A label is denoted as independent if no major label 
owns more than 50% and if they have no affiliation or distribution agreements with a 
major label. These labels are called true independent labels as they also use independent 
distributors (Passman, 2014, pp. 68-69). This is an important characteristic of the labels. 
Independent labels with a major-distribution deal rely on the distribution system of the 
major label and therefore do not promote their artists to the radio stations themselves. 
These labels usually only focus on signing new artists and have their records distributed 
and promoted by the major label. The Buena Vista label is considered as non-independent 
label. It is not considered a major label conglomerate, but it is owned by Disney. The 
Disney group owns various radio stations and has the financial power to be considered a 
major label. The categorization of artists regarding their label status is done on a song 
basis, as artists sometimes change labels and majors acquire labels or, which happens less 
frequently, major label subsidiaries become independent. The categorization is also 
displayed as a dummy variable (1= Independent, 0= Major Label). The collected data 
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does not include the name of the label or the single as it is irrelevant for the analysis and 
was not feasible due to time constraints. The collected data is used to determine the 
number of independent artists, the number of bands as well as the number of individual 
acts for every given data point and year.  
The effects of the 1996 Telecommunications Act are represented by a dummy 
variable. The dummy variable has a value of 0 for the years before the 
Telecommunications Act and a value of 1 for the years following the Act. Since the 
effects of the Act are not immediately appearing in 1996, the dummy variable has a time 
lag of three years. Therefore the values before and including 1998 are 0 and the values 
from 1999 onwards are 1. Company mergers and acquisitions can take some time, as they 
have to be approved by anti-trust institutions in some cases. The time needed for mergers 
to be finalized justifies the use of a three-year time lag. The three-year time lag is also 
chosen as the effects of the Act on the radio market structure changed rapidly until 1999. 
After 1999, the number of mergers and acquisitions remained stable as shown in Figure 1 
based on revenue concentration. The introduction of a time lagged dummy variable helps 
to better test the effects of the 1996 Telecommunications Act compared to using 
concentration indices. 
The concentration in the radio industry is measured based on the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index. There are three different HHIs to be considered in the analysis. A HHI 
based on the share of radio stations owned would best represent the concentration levels 
that have developed through mergers. It however has the disadvantage that each station 
has the same weighting. This does not accurately represent the number of listeners or 
potential market size, as a radio station in New York City reaches more people than lets 
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say a station in Buffalo, New York. The second option is the HHI based on listener 
ratings. This would include the share of listeners reached by the radio stations and 
therefore represents the concentration of the stations reach more accurately. Record labels 
prefer a station in which they can reach the most people and are not necessarily interested 
in reaching the most stations. The third option is based on the revenue concentration of 
the commercial radio stations as seen in Figure 1: Commercial Radio Revenue 
Concentration. This measure not only takes listeners ratings into account, but also the 
demographics in those markets. Advertising revenues for radio stations increase with 
their share of listeners as well as with the disposable income in the market, the share of 
the most valued target groups and other marketing related demographics. The data used 
in the analysis is based on the revenue concentration, as they include listener share in the 
markets as well as indications about income. The HHI data is however only available 
from 1993 through 2004. The years 1991, 1992 and 2005 are therefore omitted from the 
robustness tests for the regression analysis22. Revenue concentration is relevant, as the 
record labels prefer large high-income markets to smaller low-income markets. The 
expectation is that people will buy the music of their artists after hearing it on the radio. 
This is more likely in markets with larger disposable income, which tend to be the 
markets with higher listener ratings and advertising costs. All radio stations in 2nd ranked 
New York City, New York earned $1.17 Billion in 2005, while stations in 44th ranked 
Buffalo, New York only earned $74.9 Million in the same year (Duncan, 2001, p. 15). 
                                                
22 The author of False Premises, False Promises Peter DiCola as well as the publishing 
organization The Future of Music Coalition have been contacted, but the data was not 
provided. The distributor of the Media Access Pro Database, BIA Financial Networks 
was also contacted for access of the database to no avail.  
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Therefore the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index based on revenue concentration is the most 
appropriate for the analysis.  
5.2. Research Design 
The three hypotheses test changes in diversity based on the number of artists, 
independent artists and bands in the charts. This is done by using the dummy representing 
the introduction of the 1996 Telecommunications Act as explanatory variable in three 
different Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions, one for each hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1: The 1996 Telecommunications Act led to less artist diversity in the 
Billboard Radio Songs Top 50. 
Hypothesis 2: The 1996 Telecommunications Act led to fewer independent artists in the 
Billboard Radio Songs Top 50. 
Hypotheses 3: The 1996 Telecommunications Act led to fewer bands in the Billboard 
Radio Songs Top 50. 
The robustness of the results is tested by regressions replacing TelcomActt with 
HHIt. The Telecommunications Act had a statistically significant effect on the revenue 
based HHI, as can be seen in Appendix 3. 
The OLS regressions use the implementation dummy as explanatory variable and 
the year as control variable. The validity and fit of the OLS regressions is tested by 
ensuring homoscedasticity, the independence of errors and the normality of error. These 
three factors are required assumptions for OLS regressions. Homoscedasticity is assessed 
based on the chi2 of each regression and the corresponding p-value. Heteroscedasticity 
does not affect the coefficients of the outcome but might result in biased standard errors. 
The independence of errors is assessed by analysing the distribution of the residuals. This 
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ensures that the data follows a linear trend line. Lastly, OLS regressions require normally 
distributed data. The normality of errors is shown in a distribution plot of the residuals. 
Hypothesis 1: The 1996 Telecommunications Act and Number of Songs per Artist 
Hypothesis 1 is tested using the dependent variable Average Songs per Artist. The 
number of artists represented in the Billboard Radio Songs Top 50 varies due to artists 
with multiple songs and collaborations. The average number of songs per artist mitigates 
these fluctuations to some degree. The independent variable for this hypothesis is the 
dummy variable representing the implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. 
The control variable for the hypothesis is the year. The specifications can be seen in 
Equation 2. 
Equation 2: Regression H1 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑆𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡! =  𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑚𝐴𝑐𝑡! + 𝛽!𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜀! 
AvgSongPerArtistt is the outcome measure, which is represented by the average 
number of songs per artist in the Billboard Top 50 Airplay Charts. This was chosen as the 
number of artists per sample varied based on collaborations and multiple songs by artists 
in the charts. The average number of songs per artists further gives a good indication on 
diversity, as higher numbers represent less diversity. This diversity also represents the 
types of music that are more dominant as most artists can be categorized in the same 
genre within a year. The outcome further best reflects the exposure artists get through the 
radio, which is the main purpose of having songs aired on the radio. The outcome 
variable AvgSongPerArtistt therefore is a valid representation for diversity of artists.  
The independent variable TelcomAct!  is the time lagged dummy variable 
representing the implementation of the Telecommunications Act.  
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Year! is included as control variable for the analysis. This is done to control for 
general trends in the average number of songs per artist. The variable Yeart controls for 
changes in diversity based on other variables that change over the years, which might 
have an effect on the outcome. 𝜀! is the constant error term added to Equation 2. 
Hypothesis 1 is that 𝛽! > 0. This represents an increase in the average number of songs 
per artist due to the 1996 Telecommunications Act. 
The robustness of the results will be tested using Equation 3 
Equation 3: Regression Robustness Check H1 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦! =  𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐻𝐻𝐼! + 𝛽!𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜀! 
As concentration has increased with the implementation of the Telecommunications 
Act, the results from Equation 2 will be tested for robustness using 𝐻𝐻𝐼!, representing 
the revenue based market concentration. This helps verifying the results, if the results 
show similar effects. 
Hypothesis H1 is rejected if 𝛽! ≤ 0. An effect of 𝛽! ≤ 0 represents an decrease or no 
change in the average number of songs per artists, which leads to more artists in the 
charts and therefore increased diversity. This would lead to the rejection of H1. 
Hypothesis 2: The 1996 Telecommunications Act and Independent Artists 
The effects of the 1996 Telecommunications Act are analyzed based on the 
dependent variable ShareIndArtt. The corresponding parameters can be seen in Equation 
4: Regression H2 
Equation 4: Regression H2 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐴𝑟𝑡! =  𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑚𝐴𝑐𝑡! + 𝛽!𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜀! 
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The dependent variable ShareIndArt! represents the share of independent artists 
as part of all artists. Due to the fluctuations in the absolute numbers of artists every year, 
the share of independent artists offers a better representation of the developments. As in 
Equation 2: Regression H1, the independent variable is the time lagged dummy variable TelcomAct!  representing the implementation of the Telecommunications Act. The 
control variable is the Year! to control for general trends and 𝜀! is the constant error term. 
The robustness of the results is again tested using the concentration index HHI! instead of 
the dummy variable TelcomAct!, as can be seen in Equation 5. Hypothesis 2 is stated as 𝛽! < 0. This represents a decreased share of independent artists in the Billboard Radio 
Songs Top 50. 
Equation 5: Regression Robustness Check H2 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐴𝑟𝑡! =  𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐻𝐻𝐼! + 𝛽!𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜀! 
Hypothesis H2 is rejected if 𝛽! ≥ 0. An effect of 𝛽! ≥ 0 represents an increase or 
no change in the share of independent artists in the charts based on the implementation of 
the Telecommunications Act.  
Hypothesis 3: The 1996 Telecommunications Act and Bands 
The Ordinary Least Square equation for Hypothesis 3 is represented in Equation 
6: Regression H3 below. Hypothesis 3 states that 𝛽!  < 0 as a result of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act. 
Equation 6: Regression H3 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑑! =  𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑐𝑜𝑚𝐴𝑐𝑡! + 𝛽!𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜀! 
The dependent variable for Hypothesis 3 is the share of bands as part of the total 
number of artists in the Billboard Radio Songs Top 50. Similarly to Hypothesis 2, the 
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representation as share of all artists is more appropriate due to the changes in the number 
of artists per year. The independent variable again is the time lagged dummy variable TelcomAct!  representing the implementation of the Telecommunications Act. The 
control variable Year! controls for general trends over the years. The constant errors term 
is represented by 𝜀!.  
As with the previous two hypotheses, the robustness of the results is tested by another 
regression substituting TelcomAct! for HHI!, as can be seen in Equation 7. The results 
are considered to be robust if the HHI has a similar effect as the implementation of the 
Act on the dependent variable 
Equation 7: Regression Robustness Check H3 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑑! =  𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐻𝐻𝐼! + 𝛽!𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜀! 
Hypothesis H3 is rejected if 𝛽! ≥ 0. An effect of 𝛽! ≥0 represents an increased or no 
change in the share of bands in the charts based on the implementation of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act. 
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6. Analysis 
This section presents the statistical analysis of the three hypotheses as well as some 
descriptive statistics for the used dataset. The independent and control variables for all 
hypotheses are the same, the dependent variables however change. Hypothesis 1 uses the 
dependent variable: AvgSongPerArtistt, Hypothesis 2 will be measured based on the 
share of independent artists and the analysis of Hypothesis 3 will be based on the share of 
bands.  
Besides the three regression results, there are some other descriptive statistics that are 
relevant for the analysis. Table 4: Summary Dependent, Independent and Control 
Variables shows the number of observations, means, standard deviations as well as 
minimum and maximum values of the variables relevant to the regression analysis. The 
dummy variable for the introduction of the Telecommunications Act is not included as 
the values are either 0, before 1999 or 1 after. 
Table 4: Summary Dependent, Independent and Control Variables 
  
Number of 
Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
(Year) 
Maximum 
(Year) 
HHI 12
23 643.4167 474.9209 81  (1993) 
1,166  
(2000) 
Average Number 
of Songs per 
Artist 
15 1.416837 0.1041711 1.240 
(2003) 
1.596 
(1994) 
Share of 
Independent 
Artists 
15 8.133% 4.730% 3.42% (1999) 
17.76% 
(1992) 
Share of Bands 15 40.258% 11.835% 
22.32% 
(2002) 
55.14% 
(1993) 
                                                
23 As previously mentioned, the HHI data for 1991, 1992 and 2005 was not available to 
the researcher.  
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Table 5: Absolute Values Artists, HHI and Telecommunications Dummy below 
shows the absolute values for all artists, independent artists, bands and artists with more 
than 2 songs per year, as well as the HHI and the time-lagged dummy variable for the 
implementation of the Act over the analysed timeframe. 
Table 5: Absolute Values Artists, HHI and Telecommunications Dummy 
Year Number of Artists 
Number of 
Independent 
Artists 
Number 
of Bands 
Number of 
Artists 
with 2 or 
more 
songs per 
year 
HHI 
Tele-
communi- 
cations 
Act 
Dummy 
1991 111 14 60 31   0 
1992 107 19 54 32   0 
1993 107 10 59 37 81 0 
1994 94 15 44 39 84 0 
1995 98 13 49 36 98 0 
1996 98 5 51 37 176 0 
1997 104 10 48 43 324 0 
1998 95 4 46 42 443 0 
1999 117 4 39 43 1010 1 
2000 110 6 36 39 1166 1 
2001 109 5 36 48 1155 1 
2002 112 6 25 42 1077 1 
2003 121 5 30 41 1061 1 
2004 104 4 31 43 1046 1 
2005 109 8 27 36   1 
             
Average 106.4 8.5 42.3 39.3 643.4  
 
Table 5 shows that the number of artists as well as the number of artists with more 
than two songs stayed relatively stable from 1991-2005. The number of independent 
artists and bands however seem to have experienced a decline over the years. These 
trends can be better seen in Figure 16: Development of Artists and Bands below. The 
HHI as expected and shown in Figure 1: Commercial Radio Revenue Concentration 
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shows a significant increase after the implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications 
Act.  
Figure 16: Development of Artists and Bands 
 
This graph shows a clear downward trend for both the number of independent artists 
and the number of bands represented in the Billboard Airplay Top 50. The number of 
artists overall fluctuates quite a bit over the years, not only due to the number of songs an 
artist has in the charts, but also due to collaborations. These collaborations, as mentioned 
in the Data Collection chapter, are usually represented by both artists. The number of 
artists with multiple songs however show a slight increase over the analysed timeframe. 
Figure 16 seems to give an indication that there has been a decrease in independent artists 
and bands, as well as more songs per artist in the Billboard Radio Charts.  
Table 6: Correlations Dependent, Independent and Control Variables below, shows 
the correlations of the five variables used to test the three hypotheses. The dependent 
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variables are the Average Number of Songs per Artist, Share Independent Artists and 
Share Bands for H1, H2 and H3 respectively. The independent variable in all three 
hypotheses is the time-lagged dummy variable for the implementation of the 
Telecommunications Act, as well as the revenue based HHI for robustness checks. The 
Year is the control variable for all three hypotheses.  
Table 6: Correlations Dependent, Independent and Control Variables 
(N=12) Year 
Average 
Number 
of Songs 
per Artist 
Share 
Independent 
Artists 
Share 
Bands HHI 
Telecommuni
-cations Act 
Year  1      Average Song 
per Artist -0.5944  1    
 
Share 
Independent 
Artists 
-0.7318  0.5595  1   
 
Share Bands -0.9108  0.7294  0.5573  1   
HHI  0.9091 -0.7396 -0.7312 -0.9263  1  
Tele-
communications 
Act 
 0.8690 -0.7874 -0.6514 -0.9387 0.89730  1 
 
The telecommunications dummy variable is strongly correlated to the year. It is 
furthermore strongly negatively correlated to the share of independent artists and bands. 
The HHI is strongly positively correlated to the Year, and also strongly negatively 
correlated with the average number of songs per artist, the share of independent artists as 
well as the share of bands. The negative correlation to the three dependent variables gives 
first insights into the validity of the hypotheses. The decreased share of independent 
artists and bands is in line with hypotheses 2 and 3. The negative correlation with the 
average number of songs per artist however points towards the opposite result as has been 
hypothesised in H1. A decrease in the average number of songs per artist indicates 
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increased diversity. Fewer songs per artist mean that there are more artists sharing the 50 
songs in the Billboard Radio Songs charts. The three hypotheses have to be empirically 
tested in form of a regression analysis to be accepted or rejected. 
6.1.  Hypothesis 1: The 1996 Telecommunications Act and Diversity 
The diversity of the Billboard Top 50 Airplay will be measured based on the number 
of artists in the charts and more accurately the average number of songs per artists. The 
developments between 1991-2005 can be seen in Table 7: Changes in the Number of 
Artists and their Average Number of Songs. 
Table 7: Changes in the Number of Artists and their Average Number of Songs 
Year Number of Artists 
Average Number 
of Songs per 
Artist 
1991 111 1.351 
1992 109 1.402 
1993 107 1.402 
1994 94 1.596 
1995 98 1.531 
1996 98 1.531 
1997 104 1.442 
1998 95 1.579 
1999 117 1.282 
2000 110 1.364 
2001 109 1.376 
2002 112 1.339 
2003 121 1.240 
2004 104 1.442 
2005 109 1.376 
      
Average 106.4 1.416 
 
As can be seen in Table 7, the number of artists per year varies greatly, with a 
minimum of 94 artists in 1994 and a maximum of 121 in 2003. On average there are 
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105.75 artists occupying the 150 songs from the three gathered data points. The 
developments of the average of number of songs per artists can be seen in Figure 17 
Since the number of songs stays constant, the minimum/maximum values in absolutes 
can be seen in the same years as the changes in the number artists represented in the 
charts. On average, each of the 106.4 artists has 1.416 songs in the Top 50.  
Figure 17: Average Number of Songs per Artist 
 
 Hypothesis 1 is tested using Equation 2: Regression H1 with the dependent 
variable Average Songs per Artist. The results can be seen in Table 8. 
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Table 8: H1 Regression Results24 
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistic p-value 
Telecommunications Act -0.2794294** 0.0724889 -3.85 0.002 
Year  0.0126711* 0.0146477  2.32 0.039 
Constant -37.31052 16.69457 -2.23 0.045 
       
N 15    
R-Square 0.6126    
Adjusted R-Square 0.5481    
F (2, 12) 9.49    
Root MSE 0.07003    
 
The results in Table 8 show that the 1996 Telecommunications Act did have a 
statistically significant effect on the diversity of the Billboard Top 50 Radio Charts. In 
order for the parameters to be statistically significant at a 5% confidence level, the p-
values have to be below 0.05. This is the case both for the explanatory variable 
TelcomActt and the control variable Yeart. The statistical significance is further 
confirmed by the T-statistic, for which both variables exceed the 2.145 threshold for 
statistical significance at a 5% confidence level. The R-square value explains the variance 
of the average number of songs per artists, which is 0.6126. The Adjusted R-square, is a 
better indicator for regressions with fewer observations per variable (Austin & 
Steyerberg, 2015, p. 635), has a value of 0.5481. This regression model therefore 
explains 55% of the variance of the results. The scatterplot and regression line with the 
Telecommunications Act dummy variable can be seen in Figure 18. Another version with 
the year variable on the x-axis can be found in Appendix 4. 
                                                
24  * Denotes significance with 95% confidence interval (two tails) 
 ** Denotes significance at 99% confidence interval (two tails) 
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Figure 18: Scatterplot and Regression H1 
 
The coefficient of the variable Yeart shows that the average number of songs per 
artist per year increases by 0.01 every year. This is however outweighed by the effect of 
the 1996 Telecommunications Act. The implementation led to a decrease of 0.28 average 
songs per artists. This is surprisingly the opposite effect that has been hypothesized in 
Hypothesis 1. H1 expected an effect of 𝛽! > 0. The effect is however lower than 0 and the 
criteria 𝛽! ≤ 0 for the rejection of the hypothesis therefore has been met. Hypothesis 1 
stating that the 1996 Telecommunications Act decreased diversity thus has been rejected. 
The regression is further tested to fulfill the three underlying assumptions for OLS 
regressions. These assumptions are homoscedasticity, and independence and normality of 
errors. Homoscedasticity is tested with the Cook-Weisberg test. This test results in a chi2 
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value of 0.09 and a probability of homoscedasticity of 76.89. Using a 5% confidence 
level we can conclude that the data is homoscedastic. The test for the independence of 
errors is done by looking at the distribution of errors (see Appendix 5). The distribution 
does not suggest a non-linear patter, this is however difficult to verify due to the fact that 
the variable for the implementation of the Telecommunications Act is a dummy variable. 
By comparing the distribution of errors of the regression and a normal distribution it can 
be checked if the errors are normally distributed. This can be seen in Appendix 6. The 
plots suggest a not perfect normal distribution, but the deviations are minimal and we can 
assume that the OLS regression provided robust results. 
In order to verify the robustness of the results, another regression, stated in 
Equation 3, is conducted. The dependent variable remains the same, as does the control 
variables Year!. The independent variable TelcomAct! is replaced by HHI! in order to see 
if concentration has an effect on diversity based on the average songs per artist. The HHI 
based on revenue shares is used as a proxy for the Telecommunications Act. The results 
are displayed in Table 9. 
Table 9: H1 Robustness Results 
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistic p-value 
HHI -0.0002772 0.0001294 -2.22 0.054 
Year  0.0143044 0.0164473  0.87 0.407 
Constant -26.98212 32.79687 -0.82 0.432 
       
N 12    
R-Square 0.5822    
Adjusted R-Square 0.4893    
F (2, 9) 6.27    
Root MSE 0.08191    
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The individual independent variables all have a p-value larger than 0.05. All variables 
furthermore have T-statistics that do not pass the -2.201 or 2.201 threshold. The threshold 
for joint significance of the variables of 4.2565 however is exceeded at 6.27. This shows 
that the two variables are jointly significant in this regression, but not individually. This 
is due to the high correlation of the year and the HHI at 0.9091.  
The regression is again tested for homoscedasticity, and the independence and 
normality of errors. The Cook-Weisberg test shows that the data is homoscedastic with a 
probability of 99.5%. The errors furthermore seem to be independent as can be seen in 
Appendix 7. The normality results for the residuals can be seen in Appendix 8 and are not 
perfectly normally distributed. The variances however are not large enough to suggest 
that another regression method would be more appropriate. We can therefore conclude 
that the OLS regression was an appropriate method. 
The regression has an adjusted R-square of 0.4893, which explains about 49% of 
the variances. The corresponding scatterplot and regression line can be found in Figure 
19. 
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Figure 19: Scatterplot and Regression H1 Robustness 
 
The HHI and the year seem to play a role in the average number of songs per 
artist, due to the high correlation the exact effect however cannot be measured. Since the 
coefficients individually however are negative we can conclude that they have a positive 
effect on diversity measured by the average number of songs per artist. When not 
controlling for the yearly trends, revenue concentration measured by the HHI has a 
significant negative effect of -0.0001785 on the average number of songs per artists, as 
can be seen in Table 10. The negative coefficient shows that the number of songs per 
artist decreases with increased concentration. For every 1000 points the HHI increases, 
artists have on average 0.179 fewer songs in the Billboard Radio Songs Top 50 charts.  
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Table 10: H1 HHI only25 
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistic p-value 
HHI -0.0001785** 0.0000514 -3.48 0.006 
Constant  1.541793 0.0404708  38.10 0.000 
       
N 12    
R-Square 0.5471    
Adjusted R-Square 0.5018    
F (1, 10) 12.08    
Root MSE 0.07003    
 
The exact values for the effect of the HHI on radio diversity, when controlling for 
yearly trends, is difficult to determine, as they are not individually significantly different 
from 0. When testing the effect of yearly trends on the dependent variable individually, it 
shows that these trends do not have a significant effect, as can be seen in Appendix 9. It 
can however be rejected that the concentration has negative effect on diversity. The 
expected results were stated as 𝛽! > 0, which is not the case as 𝛽! < 0. The hypothesis of 
the effect of the implementation on diversity is therefore rejected. 
Conducting a regression measuring the effects of the implementation of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act results in a negative significant coefficient. Conducting another 
regression with the explanatory variable TelcomActt being replaced by the concentration 
measure HHIt tests the results’ robustness. This results in a significant negative effect of 
the HHI on diversity, when not controlling for yearly trends. The yearly trends do not 
result in individually significant results, but are jointly significant with the HHI. 
Hypothesis 1 stated that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 led to decreased diversity 
                                                
25 ** Denotes significance at 99% confidence interval (two tails) 
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shown as 𝛽! > 0. The resulting coefficients however suggest that 𝛽! < 0 and Hypothesis 1 
is therefore rejected. 
6.2. Hypothesis 2: The 1996 Telecommunications Act and Independent Artists 
The changes in the number of independent artists are based on the share these artists 
take in the Top 50. The share of independent artists takes the fluctuations in the overall 
number of artist in the Top 50 into account. The yearly developments for the number of 
independent artists and their share can be seen in Table 11 below. 
Table 11: Changes in Number of Independent Artists and their share on the radio 
Year 
Number of 
Independent 
Artists 
Share of 
Independent 
Artists 
1991 14 12.61% 
1992 19 17.76% 
1993 10  9.35% 
1994 15 15.96% 
1995 13 13.27% 
1996 5 5.10% 
1997 10 9.62% 
1998 4 4.21% 
1999 4 3.42% 
2000 6 5.45% 
2001 5 4.59% 
2002 6 5.36% 
2003 5 4.13% 
2004 4 3.85% 
2005 8 7.34% 
      
Average 8.5 8.13% 
 
 The largest decrease of independent artists and their share in the charts was in 
1996, followed by the largest increase of artists in 1997. Overall the largest number of 
independent artists can be found in 1994 and the lowest number in 1998, 1999 and 2004, 
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which are all after the 1996 Telecommunications Act. The developments shown in a 
graph can be seen in Figure 20: Development Independent Artists and Share. The share 
and number of artists follow pretty much the same path and are highly correlated at 
0.9943. The number of songs by independent artists in the Top 50 is also highly 
correlated to the share and number of independent artists at 0.9871 and 0.9870 
respectively. The number of songs is usually higher as some artists have multiple songs 
in the charts. The largest difference is in 1994, during which Ace of Base had 2 songs at 
all three data points examined. The extremely similar developments of the share and 
number of artists suggest that the overall number of artists in the charts closely affects 
them.  
Figure 20: Development Independent Artists and Share 
 
 Hypothesis 2 is tested using Equation 4: Regression H2, with ShareIndArtt being 
the dependent variable. The independent variables are, as for Hypothesis 1, the 
Telecommunications Act dummy and Yeart. The results can be seen in Table 12. 
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Table 12: H2 Regression Results 
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistic p-value 
Telecommunications Act -0.0081575 0.0352437 -0.23 0.821 
Year -0.0070547 0.0040696 -1.73 0.109 
Constant 14.180410 8.116806  1.75 0.106 
       
N 15    
R-Square 0.5558    
Adjusted R-Square 0.4818    
F (2, 12) 7.51    
Root MSE 0.03405    
 
The results for the Telecommunications Act and the year are not statistically 
significantly different from 0. The resulting p-values are all far above the required 0.05 to 
be considered significant with a 95% confidence interval. The results however are jointly 
significant as the F-value at 7.51 exceeds the required 3.8853 for joint significance. The 
Telecommunications Act dummy and the Yeart have a high correlation of 0.8690, this 
can explain, why they are jointly significant but not individually. The regression explains 
48.18% of variance as suggested by the adjusted R-square. The scatterplot and regression 
line can be seen in Figure 21. Another scatterplot and regression line, with Yeart 
measured on the x-axis can be found in Appendix 10. The regression is for 
homoscedasticity in Appendix 11, which has not been rejected. It can therefore be argued 
that the standard errors are not biased. The independence (Appendix 12) and normality 
(Appendix 13) of errors is also tested and does not raise any concerns that an OLS 
regression is inappropriate. 
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Figure 21: Scatterplot and Regression H2 
 
When considering TelcomActt and Yeart in individual regressions, Table 13 and 
Table 14 respectively, both show statistically significant negative results. 
Table 13: H2 TelcomAct only26 
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistic p-value 
Telecommunications Act -0.0610677** 0.0189321 -3.23 0.007 
Constant  0.1098327 0.0129331  8.49 0.000 
       
N 15    
R-Square 0.4446    
Adjusted R-Square 0.4018    
F (1, 13) 10.40    
Root MSE 0.03658    
                                                
26 ** Denotes significance with 99% confidence interval (two tails) 
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Table 14: H2 Year only27 
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistic p-value 
Year -0.0078704** 0.0019593 -4.02 0.001 
Constant  15.806470 3.914744  4.04 0.001 
       
N 15    
R-Square 0.5538    
Adjusted R-Square 0.5159    
F (1, 13) 16.14    
Root MSE 0.03279    
 
Both the implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act and yearly trends 
have a significant negative effects on the share of independent artists in the Billboard 
Radio Songs Top 50. The individual regressions suggest that the 1996 Act led to a 
decrease of 6.11% points in the share of independent artists, while yearly developments 
account for a yearly decrease of 0.79% points. The effects for both variables in Table 12 
are negative and the results are jointly significantly different from 0. Hypothesis 2 states 
and expected a value of 𝛽!  < 0, which is the case here. While the effect of the 
Telecommunications Act is not individually significant, it can be argued that since it is 
jointly significant, Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected. This is further confirmed by looking 
at the effect of only the implementation of the Act, which shows negative significant 
results. The Telecommunications Act, together with yearly developments led to a lower 
share of independent artists in the Billboard Radio Songs Top 50. In order to verify the 
robustness of the results, another regression is conducted.  
                                                
27 ** Denotes significance with 99% confidence interval (two tails) 
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In the robustness test, the independent variable TelcomAct! is replaced by HHI!. 
The equation can be found as Equation 5. The HHI based on the revenue share is a proxy 
for the implementation of the Telecommunications Act, as changes in the HHI can be 
seen as direct results of the act. The results for the robustness test can be seen in Table 
15: H2 Robustness Results below. 
Table 15: H2 Robustness Results 
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistic p-value 
HHI -0.0000328 0.0000458 -0.72 0.492 
Year -0.0043948 0.0060362 -0.73 0.485 
Constant  8.874447 12.03663  0.74 0.480 
       
N 12    
R-Square 0.5606    
Adjusted R-Square 0.4629    
F (2, 9) 5.74    
Root MSE 0.03006    
 
The individual variables do not have a significant effect on the share of 
independent artists in the Billboard Airplay Top 50. As previously stated, the two 
variables HHIt and Yeart have a correlation of 0.9091 as can be seen in Table 6. This may 
lead to the resulting individual insignificance and the joint significance. The threshold for 
joint significance at a 5% confidence level with 2 and 9 degrees of freedom is 4.2564, 
which has been exceeded with the regression’s F-value of 5.74. The regression explains 
46.29% of the variance as determined by the adjusted R-square. The corresponding 
scatterplot and regression line can be found in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22: Scatterplot and Regression Robustness H2 
 
The OLS regression is tested for the three underlying assumptions 
homoscedasticity, error independence and error normality. The Cook-Weisberg test 
shows a chi2 of 4.06 and a probability of 4.4%. This is below the 5% confidence level 
and the stated H0 that the variances are homoscedastic has to be rejected. 
Heteroscedasticity does not affect the resulting coefficients, but it might bias the standard 
errors. In order to control for this bias, another regression is conducted with a more 
robust method to calculate standard errors (Ellitott, 2013) in STATA. The results can be 
seen in Appendix 14. The results show that the T-statistics have increased but are 
statistically still insignificant. The bias of the standard errors therefore does not affect the 
outcomes. The test for the independence of errors is done by looking at the scatterplot of 
the residuals (see Appendix 15). Due to the limited number of observations, it is difficult 
to see a non-linear trend, but there does not seem to be one. The graph however shows 
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that there is a trend in the dispersion of the residuals that further confirms the earlier 
conclusion that the data is not homoscedastic. The errors are not perfectly normally 
distributed, but the variances are not severe enough to conclude that an OLS regression is 
inappropriate (Appendix 16). While the regression shows heteroscedasticity, a regression 
with more robust methods to measure standard errors showed some bias of the T-statistic. 
This bias however did not have an impact on the results, as the coefficients were still 
insignificant. The OLS regression is therefore an appropriate method.  
The results for the variables HHIt and Yeart individually can be found in Table 16 
and Table 17 respectively. The results in Table 17 are the same as Table 14 as the 
variable Yeart is the only explanatory variable and the dependent variable ShareBandt 
remained the same. Both regressions have been tested for the three underlying OLS 
assumptions. The Cook-Weisberg test showed heteroscedasticity for the regression only 
featuring HHIt suggesting a bias of the t-statistics. Another regression has been conducted 
with more robust methods for the standard errors, but did not lead to different 
conclusions. All other tests did not show to any violations of the assumptions.28 The OLS 
regression results can therefore be accepted, as the OLS regression is an appropriate 
method. 
 
                                                
28 HHI: Homoscedasticity in Appendix 17, Robust Regression in Appendix 18,  
    Independence in Appendix 19, Normality in Appendix 20 
    Year: Homoscedasticity in Appendix 21, Independence in Appendix 22, Normality in  
    Appendix 23 
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Table 16: H2 Robustness HHI only29 
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistic p-value 
HHI -0.0000632** 0.0000186 -3.39 0.007 
Constant  0.1108838 0.0146797  7.55 0.000 
       
N 12    
R-Square 0.5347    
Adjusted R-Square 0.4882    
F (1, 10) 11.49    
Root MSE 0.02935    
 
Table 17: H2 Robustness Year only30 
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistic p-value 
Year -0.0078704** 0.0019593 -4.02 0.001 
Constant  15.80647 3.914744  4.04 0.001 
       
N 15    
R-Square 0.5538    
Adjusted R-Square 0.5195    
F (1, 13) 16.14    
Root MSE 0.03279    
 
The results show, while not individually significant when using both variables in 
the same regression, if both variables are regressed individually on ShareIndArtt they 
both have negative significant effects. This can be explained by the high correlation of 
the HHI and Yeart. The negative coefficients for both variables in the joint and individual 
regressions suggest that both have a negative effect on the share of independent artists in 
the Billboard Radio Songs Top 50. This is further supported by the joint significance of 
                                                
29 ** Denotes significance with 99% confidence interval (two tailed) 
30 ** Denotes significance with 99% confidence interval (two tailed) 
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the two variables. It can be therefore concluded that 𝛽! < 0 and that Hypothesis 2 tested 
with the HHI cannot be rejected. This suggests that revenue concentration has a negative 
effect on the share of independent artists.  
In conclusion, both the original regression and the robustness test resulted in 
negative joint significance. The exact values for this effect is however ambiguous as none 
of the independent variables is individually significant. It can be argued that the 
implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the market concentration measured 
by the HHI and a yearly trend result in a lower share of independent artists in the 
Billboard Radio Songs Top 50. H2 expected a result of 𝛽! < 0, which seems to be 
plausible from the conducted regressions. Hypothesis 2 can therefore not be rejected as 
the 1996 Telecommunications Act had a negative effect (𝛽!  < 0) on the share of 
independent artists and the rejection criteria of 𝛽! ≥ 0 has not been met. 
6.3. Hypothesis 3: The 1996 Telecommunications Act and Bands 
The effect of the 1996 Telecommunications Act on bands is tested by using the share 
of bands in the Billboard Radio Songs Top 50 as dependent variable. The developments 
of the number of bands and their share in the Top 50 can be seen in Table 18. 
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Table 18: Changes in Number of Bands and their share on the radio 
Year Number of Bands Share of Bands 
1991 60 54.05% 
1992 54 50.47% 
1993 59 55.14% 
1994 44 46.81% 
1995 49 50.00% 
1996 51 52.04% 
1997 48 46.15% 
1998 46 48.42% 
1999 39 33.33% 
2000 36 32.73% 
2001 36 33.03% 
2002 25 22.32% 
2003 30 24.79% 
2004 31 29.81% 
2005 27 24.77% 
      
Average 42.3 40.26% 
 
The table shows that there has been a steady decline in the number of bands and their 
share in the Billboard Radio Songs Top 50. In the years before the 1996 
Telecommunications Act, the share of bands was above 50% in every year, besides 1994. 
This has not been achieved since then and has reached a low of 22.32% in 2002. This is 
also the year with the fewest bands represented in the charts. The highest number of 
bands was in 1991 and bands had their highest share in 1993 with 55.14% of artists in the 
Top 50 being bands. The trends can also be seen in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23: Development Number and Share of Bands and Songs 
 
The statistical effects of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 can be seen in 
Table 19: H3 Regression Results. The regressions are run using Equation 6 with 
ShareBandst as the dependent variable, TelcomActt as explanatory variable and Yeart as 
control variable. 
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Table 19: H3 Regression Results3132 
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistic p-value 
Telecommunications Act -0.1384763** 0.0335096 -4.13 0.001 
Year -0.0104734* 0.0038694 -2.71 0.019 
Constant 21.39305 7.71743  2.77 0.17 
       
N 15    
R-Square 0.9359    
Adjusted R-Square 0.9252    
F (2, 12) 87.55    
Root MSE 0.03237    
 
The results suggest that the implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act 
had a significant negative effect on the share of bands in the Billboard Radio Songs Top 
50. The results are significant at a 1% confidence level. The implementation of the 
Telecommunications Act led to a decreased of 13.85% points in the share of bands. The 
regression has an adjusted R-Square value of 0.9252, which indicates that the regression 
explains 92.5% of the variance. The scatterplot and regression line can be seen in Figure 
24. Another scatterplot and regression line, with the x-axis indicated by the year can be 
found in Appendix 25. 
                                                
31 * Denotes significance with 95% confidence interval (two tailed)  
32 ** Denotes significance with 99% confidence interval (two tailed) 
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Figure 24: Scatterplot and Regression H3 
 
The yearly trend is also significant at a 5% level and resulted in a 1% decrease in 
the share of bands annually. The significance of the results is shown by the T-Statistics 
exceeding the threshold of 2.145 and the by the p-value, which is in both cases below 
0.05. Hypothesis 3 states that there has been a decrease in the share of bands denoted as 𝛽! < 0. This has been proven with an effect of -0.1384763. The condition for rejecting the 
hypothesis (𝛽! ≥ 0) has not been met and Hypothesis 3 can therefore not be rejected. The 
decrease in the number of songs by bands has been separately tested and the results can 
be seen in Appendix 24. The results suggest that the share of bands explains the decrease 
in number of songs by bands and the Telecommunications Act does not have a significant 
effect. The regression used for Table 19 is now tested for robustness. 
The regression is tested for homoscedasticity, and independence and normality of 
errors. These are the underlying assumptions that have to be fulfilled to guarantee an 
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OLS regression is appropriate. The Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity provides a 
chi2 of 0.57 and a probability of 45.05% (Appendix 26). The probability is not enough to 
reject the null hypothesis of constant variance and we can therefore say that it is 
homoscedastic. The independence of errors is, as in the previous hypotheses, difficult to 
evaluate as all plots in Appendix 27 are scattered at the 0 and 1 value. The errors are not 
perfectly normally distributed, but the deviations are not large enough to dismiss and 
OLS regression as appropriate method (Appendix 28). It can therefore be concluded that 
the regression fulfills the three underlying assumptions. 
The robustness test for the results is stated in Equation 7, which still uses 
ShareBandst as dependent variable and Yeart as control variable. The explanatory variable 
TelcomActt however has been replaced with the revenue based HHIt. The Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index is with 0.9730 closely related to the dummy variable used to represent 
the implementation of the Telecommunications Act. The HHI could furthermore only 
increase its level to this extend due to the Act. The results for the robustness test can be 
seen in Table 20. 
Table 20: H3 Robustness Results 
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistic p-value 
HHI -0.0001355 0.0000649 -2.09 0.066 
Year -0.0124756 0.0085481 -1.46 0.178 
Constant  25.41511 17.04548  1.49 0.170 
       
N 12    
R-Square 0.8852    
Adjusted R-Square 0.8596    
F (2, 9) 34.69    
Root MSE 0.04257    
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The robustness results differ from the original regression results, as the HHI and 
the yearly trend do not show statistical significance. Neither variable has a p-value below 
0.005 or a T-statistic exceeding the required threshold. The adjusted R-square suggests 
that the regression explains 85.96% or the variances. This can be seen in the scatterplot 
and regression line in Figure 25. The regression is tested for the three underlying 
assumptions of OLS regressions, homoscedasticity (Appendix 29), and independence 
(Appendix 30) and normality of errors (Appendix 31). None of the tests raise any 
concerns that the OLS regression does not represent a valid model. 
Figure 25: Scatterplot and Regression Robustness H3 
 
The variables show a large joint significance represented by the F-value at 34.69. 
This indicates that the revenue concentration and the yearly trend in unison have a 
significant effect on the share of bands in the Billboard Radio Songs Top 50. In order to 
get a better idea of these effects, both variables are used in individual regressions as sole 
0.
20
0.
30
0.
40
0.
50
0.
60
0 500 1000 1500
HHI
ShareBand Fitted values
The 1996 Telecommunications Act and the Radio Industry 
Leiden University  94 
independent variable. The results can be seen in Table 21 and Table 22. Both regressions 
have been tested for the fulfillment of the OLS assumptions. None of the tests raised any 
concerns with the validity of the regression method. The tests for the HHI for 
homoscedasticity, and independence and normality of errors can be found in Appendix 
32, Appendix 33 and Appendix 34 respectively. For the regression with the explanatory 
variable Yeart the results can be found in Appendix 35, Appendix 36 and Appendix 37 for 
homoscedasticity, and the independence and normality of the errors respectively. 
Table 21: H3 Robustness HHI only33 
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistic p-value 
HHI -0.0002216** 0.0000285 -7.77 0.000 
Constant  0.5380846 0.0224658  23.95 0.000 
       
N 12    
R-Square 0.8580    
Adjusted R-Square 0.8438    
F (1, 10) 60.42    
Root MSE 0.04491    
 
  
                                                
33 ** Denotes significance with 99% confidence interval (two-tailed) 
The 1996 Telecommunications Act and the Radio Industry 
Leiden University  95 
Table 22: H3 Robustness Year only34 
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistic p-value 
Year -0.024321** 0.0028934 -8.41 0.000 
Constant  48.99599  5,781071  8.48 0.000 
       
N 12    
R-Square 0.8446    
Adjusted R-Square 0.8326    
F (1, 13) 70.65    
Root MSE 0.04842    
 
The individual regressions of HHIt and Yeart show that both have a significant 
negative effect on the share of bands. An increased of the HHI by 1000 points leads to a 
decrease of 22.16% points and the yearly trend leads to a 2.43% drop annually. Both 
results are significant at a 1% confidence interval. The results of the robustness test 
indicate a negative effect on the share of bands based on yearly trends and revenue 
concentration in the radio industry. Both coefficients, joint and individual, show that 𝛽! < 
0, which is in line with the findings of the effects of the 1996 Telecommunications Act 
and the expectations of Hypothesis 3. 
The results of the regression analysis and the robustness test suggest that the share of 
bands in the Billboard Radio Songs Top 50 has decreased due to the implementation of 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996. More specifically, the implementation of the Act 
led to a 13.85% point drop in the share of bands. There also seems to be a small negative 
yearly trend that affected the share of bands. The robustness test confirms the findings 
that the increased concentration resulting from the Telecommunications Act and yearly 
                                                
34 ** Denotes significance with 99% confidence interval (two-tailed) 
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trend led to a lower share of bands in the Top 50. The regression for Hypothesis 3 results 
in 𝛽! < 0, which is in line with the hypothesised effect. The rejection criteria 𝛽! ≥ 0 has 
not been met and the hypothesis can therefore not be rejected. 
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7. Discussion of Results 
In this section of the research paper, the results from the previous analysis chapter are 
discussed and possible reasons are explored. The chapter further includes a discussion of 
the limitations of the research and recommendations for future research. 
The analysis chapter tested three hypotheses for their validity. The first hypothesis 
expects decreased concentration in the Billboard Radio Songs Top 50 due to the 
implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. The second hypothesis is that the 
Act leads to a lower share of independent artists in the charts. The third hypothesis 
hypothesises a decrease in the share of bands in the Top 50 resulting from the 
implementation of the Telecommunications Act. The three hypotheses were tested and 
validated with robustness tests and an analysis of the appropriateness of the methods.  
The research faces some limitations regarding the availability of data. The only way 
to correctly measure the concentration of ownership, listener ratings and revenue is with 
the correct data. There is very limited public information available regarding the 
ownership of radio stations and their revenues. The only publicly available data is from 
other papers (DiCola, 2006) (DiCola & Thomson, 2002) (Chipty, 2007). These and other 
papers considering concentration in the radio industry acquired their data from the Media 
Access Pro database, which is sold by BIA Financial Networks. Since the FCC does not 
collect or publish extensive data on ownership, the BIA database is frequently used. This 
database however is not available to the researcher due to its costs, cited at $7000 by 
DiCola in 2006. The BIA website further does not provide any current pricing 
information and questions regarding access remained unanswered. Therefore the revenue 
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share HHI data is only available for the years 1993-2004. This limits the scope of the 
research on the effects of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, especially regarding 
concentration before the implementation. 
It would have been beneficial to include a similar data collection and analysis for 
different genres. This could be done to better measure the effects in those genres, as their 
overall preference also changed over the years. This could have an effect on some of the 
research. The increased popularity of a genre that is dominated by solo artists could have 
skewed the results towards the decrease of bands. Genres such as rap or country are more 
likely to have solo artists than genres like rock. The data for the overall Billboard Radio 
Songs Top 50 might therefore be affected by the rise of these genres. This could have 
been controlled for by assigning the various artists to a genre or by gathering separate 
data for genres. The collection of various genre data was initially planned but could not 
be conducted due to time constraints. The assignment of genres to various artists or songs 
is further difficult as artists might be present in multiple genres or feature an artist from 
another genre. Research into preferences in genres and their representation should be 
conducted to test and further expand on the results. 
The regressions not featuring the HHI, but using the implementation dummy could 
have been expanded beyond the 1991-2005 timeframe, which however was not feasible 
within the given time allotted for this thesis. The data collection for the number of songs 
per artists, independent artists and bands was done manually and required at least 2 hours 
per year. An extended time period for completing the research would have also allowed 
for the collection of more data points per year. The Billboard Radio Songs Top 50 charts 
are published every week and more data samples can provide more representative results. 
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Whether the inclusion of further observations beyond 2005 would have been beneficial is 
unclear. 2005 is used as limit since it was before the existence of music platforms such as 
Spotify, SoundCloud and YouTube. An expansion of this limit could be relevant if the 
importance of the radio as tool for music promotion has not suffered considerably due to 
new technology. 
Hypothesis 1, expecting a decrease in diversity of the most popular songs, has been 
rejected. The regression offers statistically significant results for the implementation of 
the Act, but the effect is increased diversity in terms of average number of songs per 
artists. The expectation was that with the implementation of the 1996 Act, record labels 
would have more influence over radio playlists, which lets them further promote their 
most successful artists. This would have resulted in decreased diversity of artists. The 
results however suggest that diversity increased and that each artist now has 0.28 fewer 
songs on average on the radio. The results do however not suggest that the influence of 
the record labels must have decreased due to the implementation of the Act. It is possible 
that the record labels use their improved negotiation position to not promote their most 
popular artists more intensively, but instead increase the promotion of all their artists. 
Record deals with labels usually last one year before they are being reviewed or revised 
(Passman, 2014, p. 116). It is possible that renewed contracts result in higher payments 
by the label to the artist. This makes it more lucrative for the labels to focus on their 
largest artists that guarantee revenue and on new artists that can provide revenue in the 
short-run. This could also be an explanation for one-hit-wonders that are used as cash 
cows for the labels. These are however only assumptions and are not tested in this paper. 
Further research on this could include an analysis of label strategies in terms of artist 
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promotion. Another reason might be that there are more artists that make the jump from 
the local to the national stage. Another possible explanation for increased diversity based 
on the average number of songs per artist could be changes in listener preferences 
regarding certain genres. Increased listenership and preferences for some genres might 
affect the number of artists and therefore the average number of songs. Artists in genres 
like rap and hip-hop traditionally use featured artists for their songs. J. Cole is the only 
rap or hip-hop artist since 199335 that released an album achieving platinum status 
without any features (True Magazine). This might be an explanation for increased 
diversity in the Billboard Radio Songs Top 50 based on the average number of songs per 
artist. While the implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act had a positive 
effect on the diversity of the most popular music on the radio, it should be further 
explored what role labels and genre preferences played in the process. 
Hypothesis 2 expects a decrease in the share of independent artists in the Billboard 
Radio Songs Top 50, which was not rejected. The regression results show that the 
implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act and yearly trends have a significant 
negative effect on the share of independent artists. The development therefore cannot be 
solely attributed to the Act, but other factors, which led to a yearly decline, have to be 
considered. The decline might not be due to the increased negotiation position of major 
labels, as opposed to independent labels, with radio stations, but due to other factors. One 
reason could be that there have been changes in the preference of genres and that these 
genres tend to have fewer independent artists. It should be analysed in future research, if 
                                                
35 Wu Tang Clan – Enter the Wu Tang (1993), Vanilla Ice – To The Extreme (1990) 
Beastie Boys-Pauls’s Boutique (1989) and LL Cool J – Bigger and Deffer (1987) were 
the only other hip-hop/rap artists with Platinum Albums. 
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a change in the genre composition of the Billboard Radio Songs Top 50 has an impact on 
the share of independent artists. Another possible reason could be the market composition 
of the record label industry. There might have been mergers or acquisitions that 
decreased the number of independent labels. The changes in the record label industry 
however lie outside the scope of this paper. There could have also been a change in the 
strategies pursued by the major labels. The labels might have anticipated larger control 
over the music that is played on the radio or felt increasing pressure from independent 
labels and therefore increased the number of artists they signed. Record labels sign artists 
to contracts that binds the artists to the label, the record label however is not obligated to 
actually create a record for the artist (Passman, 2014, p. 112). The major labels could 
have increased the number of artists they are signing for little costs and never release or 
produce any records of them. This takes away the artist base for independent labels and 
makes them financially vulnerable. This however is difficult to verify, as businesses 
usually do not share their business strategies with the public. There could however be 
further research into the number of artists signed by major labels and the number of 
releases they have, if this information is available to future researchers. The 
implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act had a negative effect on the share 
of independent artists in the Billboard Radio Songs Top 50, which was significant 
together with yearly trends and is therefore not rejected. The exact extend of the effect 
should be further research with more extensive data and information on the operational 
strategies of major record labels. 
Hypothesis 3 states that the implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act has 
a negative effect on the share of bands in the Radio Songs charts. Hypothesis 3 is not 
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rejected as the implementation together with a yearly trend leads to a jointly significant 
negative development in the share of bands. The negative effect is difficult to attribute to 
the implementation of the Telecommunications Act alone, as it does not make a 
difference for a radio station whether it is playing a song by a solo artist or a band. It 
could however be explained by the increased negotiation position of labels with radio 
stations. Contracts with bands are more risky for the labels as bands can have internal 
disputes that are not existent with solo artists. There are situations were band members 
start solo careers or a band breaks up due to conflicts and is dissolved. This poses an 
increased risk for the labels and requires them to negotiate more extensive contracts with 
bands to mitigate those risks (Passman, 2014, p. 375). Bands furthermore represent 
higher costs, such as travel, marketing and other variable costs that have to be paid for all 
members. This could have led to a shift in labels’ strategies to prefer solo artists to bands. 
This would explain the decrease in the share of bands. There might have also been 
changes in the genre preferences of listeners that affected the results. Some genres might 
be dominated by solo artists, such as rap or country, and their increased listenership leads 
to a decline in the number of bands. This again should be further researched taking genre 
specific changes as well as changes in the composition of the Billboard Radio Songs Top 
50 into account. The changes in record label strategies regarding bands should also be 
considered in further research, as it was outside the scope of this paper. It can however be 
said that the share of bands decreased due to the Telecommunications Act and yearly 
trends, the exact reasons that led to this decline however have to be further researched.  
The results support the Hypotheses 2 and 3, but stand in clear contradiction to 
Hypothesis 1, which states the opposite effect that has been measured. There are some 
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limitations to the research that would be worth to be further examined by future research. 
An important aspect of future research should be an analysis regarding the genres 
represented in the Billboard Radio Songs Top 50. There could have been significant 
changes in listener preferences of certain genres and these genres might vary greatly in 
terms of the label status and composition of the musical acts. There should also be further 
research into behavioural changes of labels. This is especially relevant for the signing 
strategies of the major labels. Furthermore there should be a research with more than 
three data samples per year to make the results more accurate. It would be furthermore 
interesting to see if the emergence of music platforms such has Spotify, SoundCloud or 
YouTube had an effect on the radio playlists, as these can be used to gain popularity 
before appearing on the radio. Overall two of the three developments are as previously 
expected. There is however some uncertainty as the radio industry and their playlists is 
not a closed system and is strongly affected by the labels, and listeners’ and musicians 
preferences. 
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8. Conclusion 
In conclusion, this thesis researches the effects of the implementation of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act on the United States radio industry, especially the effects on the 
market structure and diversity in radio programming. Chapter 2 provides an overview of 
the regulation of the radio industry before the 1996 Telecommunications Act. The United 
States first regulated radio broadcasting in 1924. The aim of the first regulations was to 
ensure that radio broadcasters serve in the public interest, convenience and necessity, 
which has been the mandate of the FCC to this day (Huntemann, 1999, p. 394). One 
aspect of the public interest is to provide diverse broadcasting. In 1996, the FCC 
experienced its first major overhaul since its establishment. The implementation of the 
1996 Telecommunications Act brought far-reaching changes to the radio industry. 
Previously established national ownership caps were removed and local ownership caps 
were increased significantly. Before 1996 the national ownership limit was 20 AM and 
20 FM stations and the local limit was 2 AM and 2 FM stations. This is further explored 
in Chapters 3 and 4. Due to the increased number of radio broadcasters and pressure to 
increase their profitability, the ownership caps have been removed nationally and 
increased locally. The station owners could now take advantage of economies of scale by 
increasing their station holdings. The research examines the effects on the market 
structure and changes in diversity. Three hypotheses that examine the effects on diversity 
in broadcasting are stated in Chapter 1.2. 
The effects on the market structure of the radio industry have been extensively 
researched on a national, local and format level. The findings are reviewed in Chapter 4. 
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The implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act led to immediate mergers and 
acquisitions of radio stations. The market structure based on ownership changed 
drastically due to the removed ownership caps, but did not lead to an oligopoly. When 
measuring listenership ratings and advertising revenues however, one can observe an 
oligopoly. The 5 largest station groups reach over 50% of listeners in the United States 
and earn over 53% of the industry’s revenue. On a local level, the changes in 
concentration are even more severe. The listenership concentration in 232 of 297 markets 
is considered to be highly concentrated. The same development can be seen in local 
revenue concentration. There are 281 of 297 markets that are considered highly 
concentrated markets. Considering format diversity in the radio industry after the 
implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act one can also observe increased 
concentration. The focus of radio stations on certain formats provides them with 
economic advantages to reduce costs. This lead to the formation of oligopolies in 28 of 
the 30 self-reported radio formats. In these formats, the 4 largest owners reach over 50% 
of the listeners nationally. On a local level the number of formats available increased, but 
increased format diversity does not equal programming diversity as can be seen in 
Chapter 4.3. 
Programming diversity is analysed using the three hypotheses stated in the 
introduction. Diversity is measured based on the average number of songs per artist, the 
share of independent artists and the share of bands. The necessary data is gathered from 
the Billboard Radio Songs Top 50 between 1991-2005. The analysis shows that diversity 
decreased in terms of independent artists and bands represented in the Top 50, but shows 
an increase of diversity based on the average number of songs per artist. The analysis 
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however shows some limitations, especially regarding the analysed data. There are yearly 
trends, which jointly account for the developments in diversity that have to be further 
researched. The developments have to be further researched based on possible preference 
changes and strategy changes in the operations of record labels. These cofounding factors 
and the resulting limitations are further explained in Chapter 7. 
The stated research question examines the effects of the 1996 Telecommunications 
Act on the market structure and programming diversity in the United States radio 
industry. The research shows that the Act had substantial effects on the market structure 
in the radio industry leading to the formation of oligopolies by most measures considered 
in this research. The effects on programming diversity are mostly negative as suggested 
by hypotheses 2 and 3, but Hypothesis 1 shows an increase in diversity. The radio 
industry however is not a closed system and developments and strategies of the record 
label industry and their effect have to be further researched. The analysis of the radio 
industry shows that the regulation of broadcasting media requires extensive 
considerations. Broadcasting media like the radio, Internet or television are not only 
affected by their own market structure, but there are other important actors that have 
provide the content. This is especially important seeing recent developments in the 
regulation of the Internet and the loss of net neutrality (Neidig, 2017). The concentration 
of power by the access providers or broadcasters might not have a direct negative effect 
on the consumer. There are however other actors that provide and control the content on 
these media. For the radio industry it is the music industry, which has control over the 
majority of music produced. The communication providers, such as radio stations, and 
the regulatory agencies are required to act in the public interest. The content providers 
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such as record labels however to not adhere to the same standards and are mainly 
concerned with the increase of shareholder value. This leads to increased importance of 
business interests over the public interest. Regulations therefore should not only address 
the consequences on the communication providers but also if the content providers can 
use those changes to further increase their business interests over the public interest. 
 
“The only part about music that I dislike is the business that is attached to it. Now, if 
music is free, then there is no business, there is just music” 
-Joss Stone, Singer 
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10. Appendices 
Appendix 1: Interview Camel_Knight36 
Thank you Camel_Knight for answering my questions. I understand you have contractual 
agreements and signed a non-disclosure and I will therefore only refer to you as 
Camel_Knight. If you feel uncomfortable answering any questions, please let me know. I 
will include a transcript in the appendix of my thesis and will use some information. If 
you would like to have a copy of my thesis once it is completed, I would gladly share it 
with you. 
As I previously mentioned, I am currently writing my Master’s Thesis on the effects of 
the 1996 Telecommunications Act. My name is Philipp Huester and I am studying at 
Leiden University in the Netherlands. If you want to respond via email, please send it to 
Philipp.Huester@gmx.de 
 
Question 1: You stated that you were a DJ for a station owned by Clear Channel. During 
what time did you work for the station? 
Answer: 2000-2008  
 
Question 2: You have stated you worked in a prime market, does that refer to one of the 
markets in Market Group #1 of the Nielsen (formerly Arbitron) markets: New York City, 
Los Angeles, Chicago, San Francisco, Dallas-Ft. Worth, Philadelphia, Houston-
Galveston, Washington DC, Detroit, Boston, Atlanta, Miami-Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood. 
                                                
36 The interview content is unedited; there have been some edits to the format. 
The 1996 Telecommunications Act and the Radio Industry 
Leiden University  114 
Answer: Yes and a #2 market, still a major metropolitan city though.  
 
Question 3: From your comments I assume you worked as a DJ after 1996. What do you 
think of the 1996 Communications Act and its effects on Radio? 
Answer:  I think it's a sham that was disguised as a way to make telcoms free and equal 
across the board. In reality this allowed big corporate radio to branch out from the top 5 
markets and buy out all the small market radio stations across the nation as we saw/see 
with Clear Channel. Its yet Another way for the government to be overtly involved in the 
peoples lives infringing on their rights. In my new profession, i have traveled the globe. 
The real equal playing field would be to allow radio waves and their content to operate 
like the internet where anyone with the know how can start their own station (like a blog 
or a YouTube channel) and let them operate how they wish. The internet is more 
available than the radio waves. I mean can you access the radio on your phone (yes 
some/most stations stream but let's say not really) why doesn't the FCC regulate the 
language used on the internet and only allow off-color content during safe harbor? It's 
because that's absolutely insane to regulate what people say and do and how they operate 
in a communications setting. I could go on forever, but basically big corporate radio got 
together and monopolized the market with the policy under an "equal broadcasting" 
masquerade.  
 
Question 4: You have stated that your station was a Contemporary Hit Radio (CHR) 
station. Did you feel there was enough diversity in terms of the artists or was it the same 
few artists over and over again? 
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Answer: There is enough diversity in artists. Yes you do here the popular ones 
substantially more, but typically the big artists have more than one hit song in the top 40 
or top 100 at a given time. The issue I have is the genre or sound. There are phases and 
several of the big hit songs have the exact same vibe, sound, beat, bed, rhythm. Like 
when a blockbuster movie comes out and is a hit, say a space movie, then 5 other space 
movies will come out within the next two years. Same thing but in stead of two years it's 
two months.  
 
Question 5: Was your Programming Director only responsible for your station? If not, 
were the other stations in the same market? 
Answer: No. He was responsible for another stationed owned by CC and some small 
ones. Often times, as the assistant program D. I would do the smaller stations.  
 
Question 6: Where the playlists mainly created on a station level or by few Programming 
Directors across the country and then distributed to smaller local stations? 
Answer: So you get your song "rating" from corporate CC, with the understanding (in 
your contract and through meetings) that you will play the top songs every hour and the 
silver songs every two hours and bronze every 3 hours, so on and so forth, but we 
planned it out ourselves how they would play.  
 
Question 7: How much control did your Programming Director have over the music 
played on your station? Was a list of songs to choose from provided by Clear Channel? 
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Answer: See above, plus as long as it was in the top 40 we were good. Same for the 
country station and the rock. They had to be a previous major hit or in the top 40.  
 
Question 8: Radio stations usually use consumer-testing pools to find the songs that sell 
best. How was the selection of these songs influenced by payola and later independent 
promoters? 
Answer: I didn't see allot of that, but I guess the work around is labels and artists 
managers would send you tons of items to give away to listeners. things like CD's, digital 
downloads, concert tickets, backstage passes, cars, vacations (of course extras for the 
jocks) and they would associate it with the artist so of course if you are giving away a 
"Beyonce Prize package" on your station, your going to play her music a lot more than 
others and more people are going to listen to try and win, giving her airtime and the 
station more customers and of course live remotes to help sell the Beyonce package 
which ties in with a local dealership or night club now that's more advertisement for the 
station and now the on air talent are getting paid $100-$300/hr for that live remote. Lots 
of money involved for everyone.  
 
Question 9: Did you have a say in programming decisions? 
Answer: The jocks don't typically, no.  
 
Question 10: Did you have the feeling that artists from major labels were preferred over 
independent artists? 
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Answer: Not really, but the major labels definitely advertised more and gave away more 
free things for us to give out.  
 
Question 11: How much local content did the playlists include and how valued was 
localism in playing songs? 
Answer: Hahaha. No value for locals at all. I even tried to pitch a "battle of the bands" 
type contest for local bands. CC shot it down. I played some locals from time to time, but 
honestly the listeners are not in to it. They want that song they know and love. I do 
remember Colby callet (this may go to a previous question) was forced on us. No one 
knew her and they just kept telling us to play her more and more then eventually she 
became a hit.  
 
Thank you again for answering my questions. 
 
Sorry it took a while, I've been traveling. Also sorry for grammar and spelling. This is on 
my phone. Good luck. I hope you do well. Let me know if you need anything else 
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